AUSTIN'S THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS

Dissertation Submitted For the Degree of

Master of Philosophy

IN

PHILOSOPHY

BY

BATOOL FAZILI

Under the Guidance of

Dr. Syed Abdul Sayeed

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH (INDIA)

1995

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY

ALIGARH . . . . . .

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the Thesis 'Austin's Speech Act Theory' submitted by **BATOOL FAZILI** in partial fulfilment for the degree of Master of Philosophy to the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, is a record of bonafide research work carried out by her under my supervision and guidance. It has not been submitted to any other university or Institute for the award of any degree or diploma.

February 1993

(Dr. S.A. Sayeed)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to the Department of Philosophy, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh and the Indian Council of Philosophical Research for grants which enabled me to work on this topic. Most of all I wish to thank my supervisor Dr.Syed Abdul Sayeed for his meticulous and considerate guidance and moral support, whose discussions enormously contributed to my intellectual growth and broadened my vision for philosophy and life. Thanks are also due to all my teachers, colleagues, hostel mates and friends for their encouragement and companionship respectively. I am especially grateful to Yusuf Delair for his encouragement at a crucial stage. Thanks also go to Tabassum Mirza and Sofia Hassan for proof reading.Above all I wish to pay grateful respects to my loving parents, who patiently spend the days of isolation during my work.

(BATOOL FAZILI)

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Around the turn of the century a revolution began in Philosophy which is not yet over. This revolution brought about such a fundamental shift in philosophical approach that if one is to understand the state of philosophy today, it is essential to concentrate on the course of that revolution which comprises the growth and development of analytical philosophy. It is palpable in the history of philosophy that different philosophies emerge in response to eachother. But it would be superficial to see analytical philosophy as a single response to any one system or approach of philosophy. There is, for that matter, no single philosophy of analysis. Although analysis of concepts has been practised in one form or the other from pre-Socratic philosophies to recent times, it is only in contemporary philosophy that the contrast between analysis and other methods becomes sharply clear.

There are as said above, many styles and approaches within or closely related to analytic philosophy, e.g., Logical Atomism, Logical Positivism, Ordinary Language Philosophy or Linguistic Philosophy, Formal Analysis, Informal Analysis and Linguistic Phenomenology. All these approaches share a common concern with language, and have

emerged as mutually contrastive developments along related lines. What is common to all analytic philosophers is the premise that the task of a philosopher ought to be to analyze language in general and to understand the structure of language by a careful study of its elements and inter-relations, and that the philosopher's job is to cure us of muddles generated by language: either by everyday language or by the technical language of the sciences.

At the moment analytic techniques have come to dominate the practice of the majority of English speaking philosophers, and analysis is the dominant mode of philosophizing in England, and America, and to a lesser yet significant extent in France, Germany, Russia and the far east. The contemporary linguistic philosophy has been practised, more or less in a similar fashion although with a somewhat different distribution of emphasis in Cambridge and Oxford. In terms of origin, linguistic philosophy flows from the analytic impulse generated by the work of Moore, Wittigenstein and Wisdom in Cambridge, and flourished in Oxford with the work of Ryle, Austin and Strawson. Linguistic Philosophy, as it has come to be called, exhibits features which are based upon a characteristic kind of recourse to ordinary usage of language, so it is also called the 'ordinary language philosophy'.

Primarily 'linguistic philosophy' is the name of a philosophical method - that is the analysis of how words function and how they relate to the world in our ordinary usage of language. Both Moore and Russell believed that philosophical problems can be solved by a better understanding of the meaning of words and sentences in our ordinary discourse. This new approach was evident in Russell's 'Theory of Descriptions' and Moore's 'Defence of Common sense'. By his theory Russell dispelled a philosophical puzzle about the status of fictitious objects by closely attending to the meaning of words and sentences. Moore propounded that the analysis of statements about our ordinary perceptions of external objects, for instance, should be analysed in terms of our common sense intuitions and not in terms of contrived philosophical premises which went against the grain of ordinary speech.*

---

* C.A. Caton says, "I mean by "ordinary" language every-day language rather than simply any (part of) language which a group of people shares. Ordinary language in this sense is the language which defines the boundaries of linguistic communities, the boundaries within which people speak. The same language or at least the same dialect. It is the language that makes possible their daily dealings with each other. It will be a large part of what a physicist or a carpenter uses in talking or writting to his colleagues, a still larger part of what

Wittigenstien's later philosophy also dealt with the ordinary usage of language, but in a rather different way. It was a departure from Russell and Moore's philosophy of ordinary language. Wittigenstien said that Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language and believed in the minute analysis of how words are employed in ordinary language. He pictured philosophy as the activity of analyzing the presupositions of our conceptual thinking and of workring out their implications. But Wittigenstein's contemporary, John Langshaw Austin, followed the theory in a quite distinctive fashion.

---

contd.

> they use in talking to their wives, and perhaps all they could do or could use in talking to eachother, or to children, shopkeepers, and policemen. Most adults are able to use and understand some technical language, at least that important in their occupation, special interests, and hobbies. This other part of their language can be used easily and naturally only with their colleagues or fellow fans: physicists with other physicists, or people who happen to know some physics, farmers with other farmers or people who know something about farming (Caton: Philosophy and ordinary language. Introduction p. VI . University of Illinois, 1963).

The analysis of ordinary language for Austin was its own justification, whereas for Wittiigenstein it was justified by the need to understand the nature of philosophical puzzlements, how these puzzlements capture our mind and how their grip can be shaken off. Austin on the otherhand believed in the minute analysis of the clusters of associated uses of words, irrespective of whether or most philosophical problems (in the conventional sense) were involved in them. This is not to suggest, however, that Austin's analyses did not shed significant light on several important philosophical problems.

It was only at the begining of the second world war that the distinctiveness of Austin's method of philosophizing became evident, which marked his later work. He thought that there was no single method of philosophy, because the term 'philosophy' covers a quite heterogenous set of inquiries which cannot share a single method. For instance, some of the traditional problems of philosophy such as free-will, truth etc, continued to be without a solution because according to Austin, these problems yet had not found the appropriate method. Therefore,Austin favoured a more circumspect approach to such problems, confining himself to the delineation of their semantic nuances. Austin was impatient with the traditional mode of philosophizing also, because to him,

argument among philosophers seemed to consist in unending dispute and controversy; disagreement and continous refutation and counter-refutation, without any progress in the understanding of the problems unlike the well regulated and smooth progression of science towards its goal. Philosophy seemed to him at times to be disorderly and inconclusive chiefly due to a lack of precision of thought and language among philosophers, rather than the recalcitrance of the problems themselves. He felt that inconclusive wrangling was indeed the characteristic of philosophy but not intrinsic to it. In his view, it was not that philosophy cannot progress like the natural sciences. Austin thought that if philosophers were to really concentrate on specific questions with clear demarcation of conceptual boundaries with sufficient rigour, it was possible to get somewhere in philosophy. He disagreed with the view, accepted by a number of philosophers with resignation that inconclusive debates were inherent to all philosophical enterprise.

Therefore, Austin did not hesitate to concentrate on seeingly trivial distinctions in ordinary usage which to him intimated important aspects of the conceptual frameworks implicit in our thinking. This, one may say, was what led

Austin to attempt the particular kind of ordinary language analysis that he engaged in.

Austin's technique was quite distinctive though he admired some of the methods and objectives of some other philosophers. He thought that the best method of doing philosophy was through group discussions, papers and symposium engaged in the clarification of specific aspects of a problem rather than long, complicated treatises which ambitiously attempted to solve a whole problem in a monolithic fahsion.

He also thought that the field of ordinary language was itself of sufficient interest and worthy of keen and rigorous study by philosophers. In this way of philosophizing, Austin thought he could develop a sort of 'laboratory technique' of doing philosophy and a proper and systematic way of analyzing and solving the problems of philosophy. This way of doing philosophy acknowledged Austin as one of the leaders of Oxford philosophy or what is called the ordinary language philosophy, in which his intense interest centred round the phenomenon of language in terms of its fine nuances of usage. But his way of dealing with linguistic philosophy was quite different and to an extent, even ideosyncratic. He did not espouse any general theory about philosophy itself which presented language pre-

eminently as both its cause and solution. But he did assign to a peculiar kind of linguistic inquiry a central role in philosophical method.

In his leading lecture 'A plea for Excuses' Austin refers to the method of proceeding from ordinary language analysis, that is, by examining 'what we should say when and why and what we should mean by it. This he considered, in itself a valid philosophical method, capable of prepapring the ground for seeking solutions of important philosophical problems. He says,

> First, words are our tools, and, as a mininmum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequecies and arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without blinkers. Thirdly, and more hopefully, our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, then any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon - the most favoured alternative method.(1)

Here Austin is obviously speaking of a method of doing philosophy - the method of making a beginning by scrutinising the resources of 'ordinary lanaguage' that men have inherited through many generations.

Austin's article 'A plea for Excuses' is an excellent illustration of his basic approach. He used the apparently unpromising topic of excuses for the exploration of the problem of free-will. In the context of this article, Austin outlined three 'systematic aids" or 'source books' to use and to work with. First of all he recommends the study of the dictionary to discover the extent of the 'family circle' of words one is concerned with in this case, the words which are concerned with or related to 'excuses', 'accidents', 'misconceptions', 'mistakes' etc. Secondly, we may consult the common law which provides us with immense miscellany of untoward cases and a useful list of 'pleas', together with a good analysis of both - the use of such words and of the social contexts in which they arise. This sort of material for analysis of language, may be as good as the material supplied from ordinary language, because in law complicated questions are decided through a careful analysis of exact meanings of words. He also recommends a careful study of psychology including anthropology and animal studies, which may yield important points for analysis.

Austin laid great stress on the seminar or group-thinking, procedure. He thought it essential in principle, to be able to agree on what was correct usage in any area. In group thinking we are guaranteed to some extent of avoiding the loose, usages of language. But the question arises, why study the ordinary usage of language in particular? G.G. New sums up Austin's response to this question under three points:-

(i) To understand what we mean, we must examine the words we use, language sets traps, especially for philosophers, and it is only by rigorously examining what we all ordinarily do with language that we can forearm ourselves against these traps. Forgetting, in the grip of some theory, the ordinary usage of some expression, we may easily slide into a misuse of it that leads us hopelessly astray.

(ii) Moreover, our ordinary words are themselves inadequate and arbitrary. Examining how they work will help us to realize this and to 're-look at the world without blinkers". Some actions for instance, like heaving a brick through your neighbour's window, involve physical movements. The etymology of the word 'action', combined with our familiarity with realatively simple cases of actions which do involve physical movements, tends to suggest that all actions in the last analysis come down to making physical movements. By examining how the word 'action' is actually used in a variety of cases, we come to see that and how this tendency is misleading.

(iii) The study of ordinary usage has a positive value also. For 'our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth

> drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking in the life times of many generations'. We should understand these at least before we go any further. Noticing and understanding these distinctions is not merely looking at words. In examining how we use the words we do, we are also examining the 'realities we use the words to talk about': Thus by examining the ordinary usage of the words with which we describe actions, we shall both rid ourselves of possible misconceptions and bring to light distinctions in the kinds of things and situations we use the words to talk about.(2)

These three points constitute a jutification of Austin's linguistic philosophy.

In giving the above three points, G.G.New aimed at the conclusion that:

> Points (i) and (ii) declare that ordinary language must be investigated so that we shall avoid distorting it or being mislead by it. Point (iii) declares that understanding ordinary language will give us a sharper awareness of distinctions in the phenomena we use the words to talk about .(3)

Another area in which Austin made crucial contribution is the domain of those utterances which constitute some actions. These utterances, uttering which is tantamount to the performance of certain actions, were called by Austin as performative utterances. The investigation of these utterances led Austin to the study of different aspects of all utterances, that is, the speech-acts that language is constituted of. And since these would be meaningful only if we understand the role and behaviour of communicators and

interlocutors, when they engage in a communicative act, Austin proceeded to study the total phenomenon of communication as such.

Austin's collection of lectures, 'How to do things with words, is largely devoted to a three-fold taxonomy, in which "to say something is to do something". To utter a sentence with a certain sense and reference is to perform a 'locutionary act'; and to do this with a certain force, is to perform an 'illocutionary act'; and finally to achieve the response, is to perform a 'perlocutionary act'.

Austin contends that the basic unit of study for philosophers should be, not only the word or the sentence, but the act which a person performs with the aid of sentences and words, because a word or a sentence tells us little about what the sentence or word is being used to say, so the total act of speech performed by the speaker with the aid of sentence is what needs to be explained.

Austin developed a taxonomy of speech-acts. First the 'locutionary act' which has 'meaning" and secondly the 'illocutionary act', which has a certain force, in saying something and finally the 'perlocutionary act' which achieves certain effect by being performed or said. All these acts lie within the context of human communication. The distinctions between these three acts, locutionary, illocutionary and

perlocutionary collapse at the end, and we discover that all utterances are in a sense performative.

Later on Austin's follower, John Searle, took his speech-acts as paradigms for his further analysis of the theory. He thought Austin's speech acts are the paradigm speech acts of communication.

To quote Searle ,

> I hypothesize that speaking a language is engaging in a rule governed form of behaviour ... The form that this hypothesis will take is that speaking a language is performing speech-acts, acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises, and so on; and more abstractly, acts such as referring and predicating; and secondly, that these acts are in general made possible by and are performed in accordance with certain rules for the use of linguistic elements .(4)

Searle believes that the purpose of language is communication and the unit of human communication in language is the speech act. He rejects the traditional concept that the basic unit of linguistic communication is the symbol, the word or sentence and following Austin argues that the production or the issuance of a sentence in the performance of the speech act is the proper unit of communication. The problem of the theory of language is to describe how we proceed from the phonetic acts (sounds or noises) to

the illocutionary acts (commands or statements) and what have to be the sounds or noises we must utter in order to issue a performative utterance or the speech act of asking a question, making a statement, or commanding etc. The rules of language according to Searle enable us to proceed from phonetic acts to the performance of illocutionary acts of human communication.

Thus in a sense. the study of speech acts, seems to be fundamental to any understanding of language. The basic unit of linguistic communication is not an expression, word or a sentence considered as a syntactic or semantic entity, but the definite issuance of an utterance in the performance of a public speech-act. All linguistic communication neccessarily involves such speech-acts. We have no choice, according to Searle, in order to understand language, but to undertake the careful and serious study of the particular sort of 'doing', which is 'speaking', in totolabelled as the "speech act".

Part-I

Significance of Performative utterances

(a) Constative Vs performative utterances

Prior to his manoeuvre of analyzing performative utterances, Austin points out that philosophers of language had assumed that the sole business of an utterance was to be either true or false. These philosophers had mostly been interested in utterances which report facts or which describe situations truly or falsely. The followers of this theory, during 1920's and 30's were grouped as logical positivists. Under the influence of wittgenstein, espeically his Tractatus, they developed a criterion of meaningfulness, called the verification principle'. According to this principle the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification, and all meaningful statements are either analytic or synthetic. All analytic truths are true by definition,whereas all true synthetic or empirical statements are true in virtue of the sense experineces, which verify them. Later this kind of approach came to be questioned on several grounds. One of the most decisive arguments against it was the sort forwarded by Searle and others. This argument centres around the status of the verification principle itself. As Searle argues, the verification principle itself is not synthetic, for verifiability cannot

be just a contingent empirical trait of meaningful utterances. Nor can this principle be analytic, since it is not an arbitrary definition of meaningfulness, which one may or may not choose to accept. The logical consequence of this line of argument is that it leads to a strong doubt about the meaningfulness of the verification principle itself.

What is pertinent in the present context, however, is the fact that on the whole, logical positivists, the early Wittigenstein, Frege and some other philosophers shared certain common assumptions with regard to the nature of propositions. All of them stressed the cognitive aspect of a proposition. To them the aim of language was to communicate what can be factually true or false. They treated the elements of language - sentences and propositions - as things that are true or false apart from any actions or intentions* of the speakers or the hears. Thus they stressed the structural aspect of language, at the cost of the performative or the intentional aspect. After the second World War these assumptions came to be vigorously challenged particularly by Wittigensten. This was the move towards the

---

* Searle stressed the intentionality whereas Austin stressed the action.

'use theory of meaning'. Wittigenstein thought that for a large class of sentences or propositions the meaning of a word is its use. In a similar fashion, Austin attempted to investigate a class of utterances that do not even set out to be true or false. He stressed the actions and intentions of the speakers or hearers, that is the performative aspect of language. Fox example, if I say, "I promise to do it" here this sentence does not attempt to state a fact about any promising, but its utterance constitutes making a promise - performing an act of promising: Austin called such utterances 'performatives', contrasting them with 'constatives'.Austin's concern remained to examine the utterances, grammatically classed as statements and yet not non-sensical and also neither true nor false. Verification theory suggested that those statements which are unverifiable are pseudo-statements. But the question according to Austin, remained whether many apparent pseudo-statements really set out to be 'statements' at all. Many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all or only intended in part, to impart information about the facts - we often use utterances in ways not covered by traditional grammer. Many especially perplexing words embedded[6] in descriptive statements do not serve to indicate some additional peculiar features of the reality reported, but to indicate the circumstances in which the statement is made or the way in which it is to

be taken. To overlook these possibilities in this way, once common, is called the 'descriptive fallacy'. But Austin thinks that the descriptive itself is only one among several possible types of statements, and all true and false statements are not descriptive. So he prefers to use the word 'constative' instead of descriptive statements. Austin believes that the traditional philosophical perplexities and puzzlements have arisen out of a mistake - "the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different".(5)

Austin's initial distinction was between 'constatives' and 'performatives'. A constative is an utterance, which roughly speaking, serves to state a fact, report that something is the case or describe what something is. Performatives on the other hand, are the utterances that have the following characteristics:-

A. they do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at all, are not 'true or false'; and

B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as saying something.(6)

This distinction was based on the difference between 'saying' as such and doing something through saying - such as promising, betting, issuing warnings etc. The utterances which are not acts are constatives and the utterances which constitute acts are performatives. The constative utterance has the property of being true or false but the performatives, in contrast can never be true or false just as any action cannot be true or false. For example expressions like "true promise", "true apology" are semantically ambiguous. They have no sense corresponding to the sense of "true statement" but have only a sense in which true means "sincere".

R.A. Lanigan distinguishes between Austin's 'constatives' and 'performatives' in terms of structure and content. He says:

> Speech acts contain what I would like to call 'structure' in that they display various types of semiotic relationships which are themselves definitive, i.e. descriptive, of what they are in fact. Some of these semiotic relationships are overtly contained in the sentences (or words that make up the sentences) as uttered by a speaker, and as such can be labeled a speech act structure. Typical relations that specify such a structure are those studied by Austin in the first instance, namely, 'constatives' and 'performatives'.(7)

The 'constative' is a well-known coinage of Austin, alongwith 'performative' but this is not a vague or trivial delineation. The constatives and performatives appear to be

two types of a class or rather two species of the same genus of utterance. The basic criterion for distinguishing the types has been the nature of the 'constative', since it carries with it the available test of confirmation or denial with an objective reference to a state of affairs. As R.L. Lanigan says;

> .... theorists are left with speculations about the nature of the thing and application of the term of performatives as unknown or ambiguous by comparison with the constative .(8)

Again Lanigan asks whether this type of optimism about the stability and reliability of the definition of constatives is justified. The answer to this question is found in an understanding of the nature of a statement. A statement, according to Lanigan, is an utterance which asserts the truth of a state of affairs. The truth or falsity of the assertion, ascription or reference can be determined by comparing the utterance to the original person, event or activity talked about. The role of a constative utterance seems to be to function as an expression of a state of affairs which contrasts with the function of a performative which is to bring about a state of affairs. According to Lanigan, Austin tries to locate this functional difference in its association with a grammatical distinction to be found in sentence forms and their uses.

Austin, however, was more interested in the 'performatives' rather than the 'constatives'. Indeed, it was the concept of 'performative' on which his speech act theory seems to be based. Now let us consider why exactly Austin found the concept of 'performative' so interesting. Austin thinks that recognition of some cases and senses, in which "to say something is to do something" is one development in the movement away from the age-old supposition in philosophy, that in at least the cases worth considering, to say something is always to state something. But how radical is this distinction and how far does it rectify this supposition?

Austin maintained that the performative nature of a certain class of utterances compels us to revise the whole traditional taxonomy of statements and propositions.

Austin gives the following examples of performative utterances:-

(E.a) 'I do (Sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)' - as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.

(E.b) 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth' - as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem.

(E.c) 'I give and bequeath my watch to my brother' - as occurring in a will.

(E.d) 'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.[9]

It is clear that in all these cases in uttering these sentences the speakers are performing certain actions and not referring to or reporting on those actions. The point to be noted, however, is that here performance is inextricably involved in the total situation of the utterance. That is, the performance must be issued in a situation appropriate in all respects for that particular act. For instance, in the appropriate circumstances, a suitable person, uttering the words, "I name ....", does not mean to report the ceremony, but to performing it. If the speaker is not suitable in the conditions required for its performance, then generally his utterance will be 'infelicitious' or 'unhappy'. Thus for naming the ship it is essential that one should be the person appointed to name the ship, that he should have been entitled to name a particular ship. If the wrong person issues the utterance, or the right person issues the utterance at the wrong ship, then 'the naming of the ship' is not done. Or for marrying, it is essential for a christian that he is not already married, with wife living, sane or undivorced. Similarly for the act of betting, it is equally necessary, that the bet is acceptable to the taker, who must have said or uttered the word 'Done', involving an action. Austin of course concedes that an action can be performed in ways other than by a performative utterance as, for instance, through a gesture, provided that the

circumstances are appropriate. This proviso is very important because if the situation is inappropriate that utterance as such would be trivial or vacuous. As Austin says, if, for example, I say 'I gift this to you' and do not hand it over, it is hardly a gift. In any case, as Austin points the terms 'true' and 'false' are not appropriate for performative utterances at all. It is only loosely that we call a promise a 'false' promise. As a matter of fact 'the promise' is 'void' or given in bad-faith. So we are mistaken in imagining that the truth of an utterance consists in its being uttered as merely the outward and visible sign. for convenience and information, of an inward spiritual act: and equally mistaken is our belief that the outward utterance is a description, true or false, of the occurance of the inward performance. But in all cases of utterances e.g. '<u>I bet</u>' or '<u>I promise</u>' whether sincere or insincere, accurate or inaccurate, is certainly to perform the act of 'promising' or 'betting'. As Austin says, the old saying that 'our word is our bond' describes the logic of performative utterance much more aptly than one would imagine.

However, there is one important point to be made here. We tend to think that one of the appropriate circumstances necessary for an utterance to be true is that the speaker should have meant it seriously. For instance, the utterance

should not have been made as a joke or should not have been part of a poem. But, to Austin, from this quite proper assumption we are likely to derive a totally mistaken inference to the effect that the utterance is true only in so far as it reflects or is an outward expression of inner intention or attitude. We are likely to feel that a promise not intended seriously is not a promise. Austin points out that this inference is wrong. The status of the utterance in no way depends on its supposed correspondence to an inward state. My saying 'I promise X' makes it a promise regardless of whether at that moment I intended it as a sincere promise or not. So Austin, settles for the words 'happy' and 'unhappy' or 'felicitious' and 'infelicitous' to describe performatives in general.

(b) Felicity Vs Infelicity of utterances

Austin specifies three kinds of infelicities associated with the performatives: These are nullity, insincerity and breach of commitment. But he points out that even if a complete classification of these infelicities is possible, they may not be sharply distinguishable and different kinds of infelicities may always overlap, that is a particular case of infelicity may be classified under more than one heading. And since a performative is both an action and an utterance, it may be liable to be substandard in all the ways in which generally actions can be, as well as in ways in which utterances can be. Take for example the issuance of a performative under duress or by an accident. The issuance of a performative utterance e.g. 'I promise to ...', uttered under duress is felicitious, but considering the actions involved with it, the utterance is infelicitious, on the other hand sometimes, leaving aside the situation in which the utterance is performed, the utterance may be misunderstood due to defective gramm r, or because it is uttered as a dialogue in a play. In these cases the utterance may be infelicitious. But Austin does not discuss this type of infelicities at large. A performative utterance may be "null and void", if for instance the speaker is not in a position or has no authority to perform such an

act e.g., the speaker is not the person authorized to perform the act of naming a ship. Or if the object by means of which he has to perform it is not suitable for the purpose, e.g. while naming a ship one cannot use a ribbon instead of a bottle to strike. Then simply issuing an utterance does not amount to carrying out the purported act. Thus, in a christian society a man does not get married a second time, he only goes through a form of second marriage: for example, one can't name a ship, unless he has some authority to name it. Therefore, uttering the words, "I name this ship 'liberte', in such a case does not constitute the purported speech act. The speech act here is "null and void".

A performative utterance may be infelicitous due to insincerity, though it may not be void or null. Let us take the example of 'I promise' or 'I apologise', if someone says, 'I promise to' and at the same time, hardly intends to carry out the promised action - the performer is intentionally insincere. And indeed he, himself may not believe that he has the authority to carry out the action, in which case the promise may be void. For e.g., if I say, 'I appoint you or promise to appoint you a judge of the supreme court' it is void because I cannot in any case fulfill the promise.

Thirdly, our performative utterance may be infelicitous, due to the violation of the purported act, which Austin calls, "breach of commitment". Supposing, our performative utterance has been issued quite normally and apparently sincerely, the performative utterance would be considered characteristically to have taken effect. Here the effect is not to be considered to be the cause of the prior act, but the future event will be in order and the utterance e.g. "I promise" will be felicitious. But for example, if someone says, 'I welcome you' which is a performative utterance, the act will not be in order, if he proceeds to treat the visitor as an enemy or an intruder, instead of showing hospitality. Thus even if the performative has taken effect, there is always a possibility of a third kind of infelicity, which is the, breach of commitment.

Austin believes that performative acts are conventional acts , for example in law and in games and many other cases, we follow certain rules by a convention. In some cases, following the relevant conventions usually consists of and includes uttering of certain words. In these cases one who issues the relevant utterance, in appropriate circumstances, not merely says something, but by a convention does something, that is he performs the act of doing, while

saying something e.g. conventionally one cannot say 'I baptize this dog'.

Besides uttering the words of so called performative, we have to follow some general rules if we are said to have happily brought-off our action. Here Austin classifies the types of cases in which something goes wrong and the acts of -"marrying, betting, bequeathing, cristening", etc. - end up in failure. In such cases utterances are not false but in general unhappy or infelicitious. And this doctrine of "the things that can be and do go wrong" is called the doctrine of "infelicities".

For avoiding the infelicity of performative utterances Austin gives six rules, the violation of any of which can create an infelicity of performatives. These six rules are:-

(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

(A.2) The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and

(B.2) completely.

(T.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a

person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further

(Γ.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.(10)

Austin tries to analyze the applicability of these rules of infelicity in accordance with each other, of which four are such as to make the utterance misfire by their violation. Firstly he distinguishes A and B rules taken together, secondly he distinguishes these as opposed to the two rules Γ.1 and Γ.2. Thus, according to Austin;

If we offend against any of the former rules (A's or B's) - that is if we, say, utter the formula incorrectly, or if, say, we are not in a position to do the act because we are, say, married already, or it is the purser and not the captain who is conducting the ceremony, then the act in question, e.g. marrying, is not successfully performed at all, does not come off, is not achieved. Whereas in in the two Γ cases the act is achieved, although to achieve it in such circumstances, as when we are, say, insincere, is an abuse of the procedure. Thus, when I say 'I promise' and I have no intention of keeping it, I have promised but ... We need names for referring to this general distinction, so we shall call in general those infelicities A.1 - B.2 which are such that the act for the performing of which, and in the performing of which, the verbal formula in question is designed, is not achieved, by the name MISFIRES: and on the other hand we may christen those infelicities where the act is achieved ABUSES (do not stress the normal connotations of these names!) when the utterance is a misfire, the procedure which we purport to invoke is disallowed or is botched: and our act (marrying, &c,) is void or without effect, & C.(11)

This hardly means that we have not done anything. Though the utterance may be void, lots of things will have been done - but we will not have done a meaningful act. By distinguishing among the sets of rules of infelicity as opposed to each other, Austin introduces a scheme which he later develops into a classification of infelicities. We have a clear-cut distinction between the six rules. The scheme is as follows:



As regards the extent and variety of 'acts' which are subject to 'infelicity', Austin maintains that infelicity is an ill to which all acts are heir. The performatives have a general character of the ceremonial like all conventional acts. However, not every ritual is liable to every form of

infelicity, nor is every performative utterance. But in so far as the utterances used in the law are the acts of law, and the acts which fall within the province of ethics are not simply physical movements but are acts, many of which have a general character of conventional or ritual acts, all these are exposed to infelicity, G.J. Warnock agrees with Austin's view of performative utterances as those which by convention constitute doing, something, and which by the same connections are subject to infelicity.

He says:

> For if it is to be by convention that to say X constitutes doing Y, it will be illuminating to consider why, and in how many sorts of ways, saying X sometimes doesn't quite, or even at all, amount to doing Y - why, and in how many sorts of ways, the purported doing may not happily 'come off'. What is involved in doing it properly will be illuminated by considering how things may go wrong. For of course, in these cases, doing is never just saying:it is saying 'happily' - saying, that is, in the absence of the sorts of things that Austin called misfires and abuses - misapplications, flaws, hitches, insincerities, and what not. Where there is a convention that to do (e.g. say) X counts as Y, y will only actually get done if X is done (e.g. said) by the right person, at the right time and place, in the right way, and so on.(13)

Now the question arises, whether the notion of infelicity applies to the utterances which are statements as well? Austin thinks that statements can be 'outrageous', e.g. 'the present king of France is bald', which refers to

something which does not exist. But it would be very misleading to say that statements are liable to 'infelicity' as such. Therefore, as already pointed out, constatives or descriptive statements, can be true or false, whereas performatives can be felicitous or infelicitious.

Thus Austin claims that infelicity applies to all performative acts, which by convention are ceremonial acts and not merely verbal ones.

However, Austin admits that our list of infelicities is not complete, because actions in general are liable to them, e.g., those done under duress or by accident or unintentionally. As utterances our performatives also are liable to other kinds of ill which infect all utterances, e.g., a performtive utterance may be void, if said by an actor on a stage, which applies to all uterances. Also that a 'performative' e.g., 'I promise' should have been heard by the promisee and should have been well understood by him as promising and not merely joking. And if one or the other conditions are not fulfilled, doubts can arise whether I have really promised or only attempted to promise.

Thirdly, Austin asks whether these classes of infelicity are mutually exclusive. Here again he admits that these are not exlusive in the sense that we can go wrong in

two ways at once, e.g., we can insincerely promise a donkey to give it a carrot. More importantly, the ways of going wrong overlap. For example, I see a vessel on the stocks, and approach to smash the bottle hung at the stem, proclaim 'I name this ship Mr. Stalin' and kick away the cocks: but I was not the person chosen to name it or may be perhaps it was Mr. Stalin only destined to name it, in such a case we all agree that the ship was not thereby named; but I went through a form of naming the vessel.

Thus according to Austin, different infelicities can overlap and that it can be more or less an optional matter how we classify some particular example. Therefore, Austin next proceeds to the infelicities created out of the infringement of the six rules of infelicity already discussed.

Austin begins by recalling the first two of the six rules he had formulated, which say

> (A.1) that there must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances; and rule A.2 ... that the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.(14)

According to Austin, the rule A.1 contains two words 'exist' and 'accepted' which need attention. If a performative utterance is classed as a misfire because the invoked procedure is 'not accepted', it is presumably persons other than the speaker who do not accept it. Take the example, 'I divorce you', said to a wife by her husband (in a Christian context). Here the utterance is a misfire because there is no procedure at all for effecting divorce. We may never admit any 'such' procedure for doing a particular thing. But equally there are possibilities of accepting a procedure in certain circumstances but not in any other circumstances or situations. So, here we may often be in doubt - e.g., in the naming of a thing - whether an infelicity should be brought into the class A.1, or into the class A.2. For example, Austin says:

> On a desert island you may say to me 'Go and pick up wood': and I may say 'I don't take orders from you' or you are not entitled to give me orders' - I do not take orders from you when you try to 'assert your authority' (which I might fall in with but may not) on a desert island, as apposed to the case when you are the captain on a ship and therefore genuinely have authority.(15)

Now bringing the case under A.2, the procedure uttering certain words may be acceptable but the circumstances in which it is to be invoked, or the persons who invoked it may

be wrong: For example, a command is in order only when the subject of the verb is an authority.

Or again Austin brings the case under the rule B.2. The procedure has not been completely executed; because it is essential that the person to be the subject of the verb or the performer, e.g., 'I order to' should by some previous procedure, have been constituted the person who is to do the ordering or has been given an authority, e.g., by saying, 'I promise to do what you order me to do'.

Secondly Austin explains what is meant by the suggestion that sometimes a procedure may not even 'exist' as distinct from 'accepted'. There are cases of procedures which 'no longer exist', e.g. take the case of 'challenging', which in olden societies was generally accepted as rule for duelling. That is the utterance 'my seconds will call on you' could be treated equivalent to 'I challenge you' in duelling. But in present societies the procedure does not exist and therefore not accepted. Also we have the case of procedures which someone is initiating. For example, in the game of football the person who first picked up the ball and ran-away, did initiate another game, came to be accepted as a game or the student duelling in Germany in the hey-day, the accepted procedure would be that the members of one club

to march past members of a rival club, each drawn up in file, and then for each to say to his chosen opponent as he passed, very politely, 'I insult you'. But in normal circumstances if we proceed to say; I insult you' instead of persuing the act of saying 'you are a coward' or 'you are ugly' which is an insult, does arise misinvocations. The procedure in that sense is merely a verbal one, for insulting is a conventional procedure.

Austin assumes that it is inherent in the nature of any procedure that the limits of its applicability are imprecise and the definition of the procedure vague. There will always occur difficult cases where nothing in the previous history of a conventional procedure will decide conclusively, whether such a procedure is or is not correctly applied to such a case. For example, Austin says,

> Can I baptize a dog, if it is admittedly rational? Or should I be non-played? The law abounds in such difficult decisions - in which, of course, it becomes more or less arbitrary whether we regard our selves as deciding (A.1) that a convention does not exist or as deciding (A.2) that the circumstances are not appropriate for the invocation of a convention which undoubtedly does exist: either way, we shall tend to be bound by the 'precedent' we set.(16)

The performative utterances which Austin takes as paradigm cases or conventional cases are as he calls them,

highly developed affairs - i.e., 'explicit peformatives'. We need to use the explicit performatives in order to decide whether or not the utterance is a performative. To decide the utterance in either way, the procedure in question, is explicitly or implicitly invoked, putting an utterance on a test, whether it is performative or not. We make use of an asymmetry, in the case of what is called 'explicit performative' verb, between the first person singular of the present indicative active and other persons and tenses of the same verb. For example, 'I promise' is an explicit performative which is used to perform the act of promising; and on the other hand 'I promised' or 'he promises' are the expressions which simply describe or report an act of promising. Austin did not claim it necessary for a performative to be expressed in one of these forms, but used them to contrast 'performatives' from the 'constatives'.

Let us now explain the infringement of the rule A.2; which Austin call 'Misaplications':

> A.2. The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked .(17)

Here Austin gives us an example of a performative utterance, 'I appoint you'. It may be that the person has

already been appointed or already someone else has been appointed or I am not entitled to appoint that person or the person in question is other than the person who is in need of a job. So here we have different types of inappropriateness. But the point is that, we need to distinguish not between the 'inappropriate persons' and 'inappropriate circumstances', but between the cases where the unappropriateness of persons, objects, names etc., is a matter of 'incapacity' and simpler cases where the object or performer is of the wrong type. For example, in the words of Austin,

> we must distinguish the cases of a clergyman baptizing the wrong baby with the right name or baptizing a baby 'Albert' instead of 'Alfred", from those of saying 'I baptize this infant 2704' or 'I promise I will bash your face in' or appointing a horse as Consul. In the latter cases there is something of the wrong kind or type included, whereas in the others the inappropriateness is only a matter of incapacity .(18)

Next Austin discuses B.1 and B.2, called 'Misexecutions'. "B.1 The procedure must be executed by all participants correctly . These are flaws. They consist in the use of, for example, wrong fomulas - there is a procedure which is appropriate to the persons and the circumstances, but it is not gone through correctly."(19)

These Austin calls inexplicit formulas - vague formulas and uncertain references. For example, if we say, 'my house' when I have more than one or if say, 'I bet you the race won't be run today' when more than one race was already organised.

B.2. The procedure must be executed by all participants completely .(20)

These are 'hitches' resulting from some of the parties involved in the act not carrying out their part of the procedure. We may attempt to carry out the procedure but the act is abortive. For example, someone attempts to make a bet by saying 'I bet you six pence', but it would be abortive unless the hearer accepts the bet by saying 'I take you on'. Again, if someone attempts ceremonially to open a library, the act is abortive if he says 'I open this library' but the key snaps in the lock; conversely the christening of a ship is abortive if one kicks away the chocks before uttering 'I launch this ship'. Here again, in our ordinary life a certain flexibility in procedure is permitted, but the principle remains the same. In formal cases, some reciprocal gesture is expected by the party at the receiving end of a ceremonial act. Uncertainities arise if, for instance an appointment is made without the consent of the person appointed. Here the question arises as to how far acts can

be unilateral the act is complete, or incomplete, or what counts as its completion.

Though Austin invokes further dimensions of infelicity, he rejects them. These involve possibilities of the performer making a simple mistake of fact or of disagreements over the matters of fact, which can create further dimensions of infelicity. Austin's analysis of infelicity in terms of infringement of the rules of performative acts is basically to show how attendant conditions can in various ways make performatives go array.

Austin admits that in handling performatives it seems as if the only thing that a performative utterance had to do was to be felicitious, and not to be a misfire or an abuse. But the matter cannot end here and the utterances we have classed as performatives e.g.; 'I warn you to' 'I advise you to' etc will be further subject to questions such as, was it in order, was it good or sound advice? Was it a justified warning? These questions Austin says, can only be decided by how the content of warning or advice is related in some way to fact or to evidence available about the facts. So one can assert here that we need to assess at least a great many performatives in a general dimension of corespondence with facts. Still we may say that performatives are unlike

statements because they are not true or false. Moreover, when truth and falsity are taken seriously, it seems that very few statements that we ever utter are just true or just false. Usually they are liable to questions such as whether they are fair or not, adequate or not adequate, exaggerated or not exaggerated and so on? 'True' and 'false' according to Austin are general labels for a whole dimension of different appraisals which have something or other to do with the relation between uterances and facts. Again if we do not stress truth and falsity, we find that statements when assessed in relation to the facts are not very different from performatives like advice, warnings, and so on.

Thus stating something is performing an act just as much as is giving an order or a warning, and on the other hand, when we give an order or warning, there is a question about how this is related to the fact, which is not perhaps so very different from the kind of question that arises when we discuss how a statement is related to fact. Therefore, Austin's distinction between the constatives and performatives, in its original form consideriably collapses. J.R. Searle Says:

> Making a statement or giving a description is as much performing a speech act as making a promise or giving an order. So what were originally presented as special cases of utterances (performatives) now

> are seen to swallow the general cases (constatives), which turn out to be only one class of speech acts among others.(21)

Thus making a statement or giving a description is as much performing an act, as making a promise. The original distinction between the statements or descriptions and the utterances which are acts of performatives, also collapses due to the true/false theory of utterances or expressions, with the later developments. It seems evident that the performatives also can be liable and assessed as true and false, whereas constatives can be assessed as <u>felicitious</u> and <u>infelicitious</u>.

Searle points out that "Austin's distinction of "felicitous" and "infelicitous" speech act fails to distinguish between those speech acts which are successful but defective and those which are not even successful".(22) For example if someone says, 'I hereby excommunicate you', the speech act will be absolutely unsuccessful, unless various conditions for it to be successful are not fulfilled. On the other hand if someone makes a statement for which he or she has no sufficient warrant or evidence, he or she might succeed in making a statement, however, it would be defective - because of lack of evidence. Such a type of speech act is successful but defective. An ideal speech act is both successful and non-defective.

Part-II

LOCUTIONARY, ILLOCUTIONARY AND PERLOCUTIONARY ACTS

In our exposition of Austin's constative/performative distinction, we found that the distinction collapses at the end, surviving only with the proviso that constatives also can be as much speech acts as the performatives.

The constatives turn out to have dimensions similar to those of felicity and infelicity, whereas many performatives can be assessed in a dimension of correspondence with facts, though initially Austin starts with its converse - i.e. the performatives can be felicitous or infelicitous and constatives can be true or false. While dealing with the constatives—performative distinction it seems that the constatives too are not distinct from warnings, advices, or verdicts and so on. A statement related to the constative utterance, e.g. 'John is running', is the statement 'I am stating that John is running' which may depend for its truth value on the truth of 'John is running', Just as the truth value of 'I assert that I am apologizing' depends on the felicity of 'I apologize'. On the other hand, take for instance the performative utterance, 'I warn you that the bull is about to charge'. If it is the case that the bull is

not about to charge (and the person uttering the sentence did not know that the bull is about to charge), we cannot say that the warning was void or insincere or has any type of infelicity (in the Austinian sense), but we are inclined to say that the warning was false or mistaken. Our discussion of the distinction of constatives and performatives also suggests that both the acts or the type of utterances are analogously tied to the whole situation in which they are uttered. Thus the presumed field of performatives and constatives turns out to be the part of the domain of speech acts.*

---

* But the historical fact is that the performative-constative destinction has become a part of philosophical vocabulary. Walter Cerf, in his critical review of HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS compares the performative - constative distinction with the classical hallmarks in analytical philosopy, such s Ryle's 'ghost in the machine' and the 'Language games' of Wittigenstein, as well as Kant's analytic and synthetic Judgements. Though Austin himself came to be quite critical of his performative - constative distinction, yet the distinction continued to enjoy an important place in the subsequent philosophical literature.

Austin in his lectures HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, initially developed the speech act theory centering around the distinction between performatives and constatives. In this distinction Austin highlights the performative utterances and finds a way to develop explicit performatives from the primary performatives, Austin feels it fair to say that in the evolution of language, the explicit performatives are later developments in the history of language, e.g. 'I will .....' is more primitive then 'I promise that I will ....' Therefore, he feels it necessary to embark on the list of explicit performative verbs - which have force. However, inengaging ourselves in the programme of finding a list of explicit performative verbs, we find that, it is difficult to distinguish performatives from constative verbs. Thus it seems expedient to go back to consider how many senses there are in which to say something is to do something or in saying something we do something or even by saying something we do something. Thus we find that in the theory of speech acts propounded in the lectures VIII to XII of HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, the land of speech acts has been divided into three provinces, locutionary, illocutionary and the perlocutionary acts. Let us examine these provinces one by one.

LOCUTIONARY ACT:

In the process of developing the speech act theory in terms of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary components of speech acts, Austin reconsiders more generally the basic senses in which to say something may be to do something, or 'in saying something we do something': issuing an utterance is to perform an action, but here certainly the word 'action' involves a confusion. As Austin says,

> We may contrast men of words with men of action, we may say they did nothing, only talked or said things: yet again, we may contrast only thinking something with actually saying it (out loud), in which context saying is doing something.(23)

Again, Austin deals with the circumstances and situations of 'issuing an utterance' -the different senses in which to 'say something is actually to do something'. The whole group of senses he labels as A,B, and C senses - in which to utter, assert or say something must always be to do something - this group of senses which together makes a 'saying', or a complete speech act are also called locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts respectively. But how many senses are there in which 'to say something is necessarily to do something? Are these senses such as 'of saying something we do something' or 'in saying

something we do something' or 'by saying something we do something'?

Arguably in a communicative situation what counts as a speech act or what the nature of an individual utterance is, would be difficult to define. The sheer act of utterance as such Austin calls the locutionary act. To quote Austin, the locutionoaory act is that

> which includes the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them with a certain 'meaning' in the favourite philosophical sense of that word, i.e. with a certain sense and with a certain reference.(24)

Thus the act of 'saying something' in such a full normal sense, Austin calls 'the performance of a locutionary act, and the study of these locutions is the study of the full units of speech.

The locutionary act is associated with the meaning of an utterance. But it may further be asked as to how what was said was meant by the speaker and how the words were used or how the utterance was to be taken or ought to have been taken. So prior to the investigation of the illocutionary acts we need to investigate the meaning of the utterances - the meaning which according to Austin involves sense and reference.

P.F. Strawson explains the locutionary act in terms of the three senses of its meaning and analyses the phrase "The meaning of what was said*" into three senses. Suppose a sentence of a particular language has been uttered on a certain occasion and suppose someone X, only knows what sentence was uttered but knows nothing of the identity, place and time and other circumstances of the speaker. Though X has a complete mastery of the language in which the sentence has been uttered, he does't know anything of the person (e.g. John) to whom the sentence refers. That is, x may not know the full import of the sentence. Nevertheless, he knows the 'meaning' of that sentence in the sense of meaning in terms of the syntax and semantics of the language in question.

Strawson calls this sense of meaning the "linguistic meaning" or the sense A - of meaning.

Secondly, if X, knowing the sense - A - meaning of what was said, is informed about the referents in the statement, then, given the knowledge of the name refered to, his uptake of the sentence in its full sense would be the

---

* The phrase is from Strawson's article on "Austin and locutionary meaning" in the Essays on J.L. Austin, Oxford Press, 1973, p.46.

"linguistic-cum-referential meaning" or the 'sense -B- meaning'. What one learns from the progression of the sense-A- meaning of what was said, to the knowledge of its sense-B- meaning is the understanding of the sentence in its full referential sense. Hence locutionary meaning is the same as sense-B-meaning, such that it includes sense-A-meaning.

Further, Strawson points out that the full sense of 'the meaning of what was said, cannot be complete without the comprehension of the knowledge of sense-B- meaning of how what was said was taken and intended' with its complete grasp, together with the knowledge that this grasp was complete. This full and complete grasp of 'the meaning of what was said' strawson calls the sense-C- meaning or "complete meaning".

Though Austin seems to ignore these developments of the meaning of locutionary acts, yet he refers to the linguistic conventions which determine the locutionary act and also determine it's meaning.

In his discussion of Austin's theory, Strawson agrees with Austin on the point that there are linguistic conventions which help to fix the meaning of the utterances which effectively means that locutionary acts are conventional acts. But he points out that Austin has not made

clear, what abstractions from the total speech act he intends to make by means of his notions of meaning and of locutionary act. This point Strawson develops in terms of the meaning, in relation to the force of an utterance i.e. - the locutionary and the illocutionary act. The meaning of serious utterance as conceived by Austin embodies some limitations on its force, but sometimes the meaning does not exhaust its force, in which case there is no more to know about the illocutionary force of an utterance than we already know what locutionary act has been performed.

To put it simply, 'issuing of an utterance' Austin says, involves uttering of certain noises, uttering of certain words belonging to a certain vocabulary and conforming to certain grammar, and the act of using these words with a certain sense and reference which he calls the "locutionary act".

John Searle explains the locutionary act thus:

> In a typical speech situation involving a speaker, a hearer, and an utterance by the speaker, there are many kinds of act associated with the speaker's utterance. The speaker will characteristically have moved his jaw and tongue and made noises. In addition, he will characteristically have performed some acts within the class which includes informing or irritating or boring his hearers; he will further characteristically have performed acts within the class which includes referring to Kennedy or Khrushchev or the North Pole;(25)

Now let us go back to Austin's concept of individual utterances, in performing which we do somethig (i.e. locutionary acts). These locutionary acts are a means of determining what the genus 'speech act' is. To be complete locutionary acts embrace doing many things at once. Therefore, Austin classifies the locutionary acts into three sub-acts of phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts. He says,

> The phonetic act is merely the act of uttering certain noises. The phatic act is the uttering of certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types, belonging to and as belonging to, a certain vocabulary, conforming to and as conforming to certain grammar. The rhetic act is the performance of an act of using those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference.(26)

1. Phonetic acts or phones:

The utterance of certain noises or sounds Austin calls phones. To utter the noises or sounds in a normal, simple sense is to perform a phonetic act. Uttering noises or sounds in such a simple, normal sense Lanigan maintains, is a conventional rule-governed activity. But Austin does not seem to associate phonetic acts necessarily with the conventions of language. But the phonetic acts are always a part of language - otherwise the utterance would be senseless. Sometimes, certain noises or sounds may not be convnentional and yet they may fulfil a communicative function. For example to express pain, one simply utters the sounds, 'ouch'

'ooh' or 'Ah' etc. By content and form these utterances are meaningless but they can be expressive in a particular situation. But Austin while dealing with the meaning of utterances, suggests that phonetic acts often prove to be meaningful utterances. But the point is that a monkey's noise even if indistinguishable from the English word 'go' can not be a meaningful utterance, and conversely a sentence "slithy toves did gyre", cannot be a phonetic act, because in order to perform a meaningful act' the utterance or a sentence involves vocabulary and grammar. Thus a speaker uses a word or unit of speech or a symbol for a referent which results in a meaningful utterance. To go beyond the phonetic act is to move to the second level of the locutionary act i.e., the phatic act. Because uttering mere noises, without any sense or reference and unregulated by vocabulary and grammar cannot result in a locutionary act.

It must be however, pointed out that, in order to be amenable to the movement to the phatic, the phonetic act must already be a unit of some language. In the final analysis, mere noises cannot be 'phones', i.e. they cannot be constituents of a locutionary act.

J.R. Searle while explaining speech acts, concentrates on the point that the speech act is an act of linguistic communication, and the unit of linguistic communication is

not simply a word, sentence or a symbol etc, but the production or the issuance of a word, sentence or symbol. Speech acts are the basic units of linguistic communication. But the question is, what is the difference between regarding an object as an instance of linguistic communication and not so regarding it? Searle differentiates it in association with the intentional behaviour.

He says,

> When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper to be an instance of linguistic communication, as a message, one of the things I must assume is that the noise or mark was produced by a being or beings more or less like myself and produced with certain kinds of intentions: If I regard the noise or mark as a natural phenomenon like the wind in the trees or a stain on the paper, I exclude it from the class of linguistic communication, even though the noise or mark may be indistinguishable from spoken or written words.(27)

2. Phatic acts or Phemes

The phatic act according to Austin, is "the uttering of certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types, belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar".(28)

Since Austin pleads that the three sub-acts of locutionary act constitute a locution all the three sub-acts should be considered in relation to each other. And obviously it is necessary that in order to perform a phatic

act one must perform a phonetic act -in performing one act we perform the other also. But the converse is obviously not true since, in principle, one may utter a sound which is not part of any language, in which case it cannot be called a phatic-act, because it is not a meaningful act. Again Austin seems to stress upon vocabulary and grammar, which govern a phatic act, because a phatic act involves certain types of noises necessarily belonging to a certain vocabulary and conforming to a certain grammar.

The phatic act cannot be performed apart from the phonetic act, e.g. one cannot utter words without making some sounds but one can obviously make noises without uttering words. According to Austin phatic acts are also reproducible or mimicable like phonetic acts. Sentences can be uttered that have no meaning (i.e. without sense and reference) or can be 'non-sensical', while meanings cannot be conveyed without uttering the words (except in a written language) which do include phones. Therefore, a phatic act has to be understood in relation to the phonetic act. Now let us examine the third sub-act, i.e. 'rhetic act' without which the locutionary act is incomplete in the Austinian sense.

3. Rhetic Act or Rhemes

> According to Austin, to perform a rhetic act is, "generally to perform the act of using the pheme or

> its constituents with a certain more or less definite 'sense' and a more or less definite 'reference' (which together are equivalent to 'meaning'). This act we may call a 'rhetic' act and the utterance which it is the act of uttering a 'rheme'." (29)

Austin maintains that in rhetic acts we report, a fact. For example, 'He said he would go' or 'He said that the cat was on the mat,' are such rhetic acts. Austin believes these are the so-called "Indirect speech" assertions.

As we know 'Indirect speech' is a method of reporting an utterance. There are some mental states, and the reports of such states of mind involve the indirect speech construction. In this type of speech an indirect intention is reported, e.g. 'James said that man is mortal' is not about the form of words, but it reports a faith.Kenny says that if the word, '<u>about</u>' which they contain is explained in such a sense that a sentence can be about an object if it contains a name for that object. But no indirect speech sentence is about the form of words. Thus Anthony kenny argues that in a sense,

> no oratio obliqua sentence is about a form of words, But in this sense - so I shall later argue - no sentence of any kind is ever about anything . (30)

If an utterance or sentence is considered to be about the form of words produced by a particular speaker in a certain situation then no doubt, 'He said, "the cat is on the mat"', and 'he said that the cat was on the mat', may be said to be about the words - both these sentences are reports of utterances. Again Kenny argues that the utterance which it reports need not be utterance of the words, e.g., "man is mortal", one may have said that man is mortal by uttering the words "Homo est mortalis" and such an utterance may also be reported in the form, 'James said, "man is mortal". For if leaving the sentence 'Homo est mortalis' untranslated, James may say e.g. 'man is mortal' in answer to the question what is the meaning of 'homo est mortalis'? or after puzzling over the crossword clue 'O Smart Milan'. In these cases James does not say that 'man is mortal' therefore none of these sentences report about the form of words. Kenny relates the saying, 'man is mortal' and the saying that man is mortal, to Austin's phatic and rhetic acts.

Sometimes the reference is not clear in these assertions, in that case the whole or the part is to be taken in quotation marks. For example, we may say, He said, 'I was to go to the minister', but did not mention which minister he was going to meet. Here reference to a particular name or object named is not clear. Now the question is, can we

perform a rhetic act without naming and referring? Generally it seems that we cannot, but there are cases, e.g., 'All triangles have three sides', in which without naming and referring, we perform a rhetic act. The above sentence has sense, but has no definite reference to a name.

While explaining Austin's phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts in relation to each other, Anthony Kenny says,

> As we have already seen, the same rhetic act may be performed by different phatic acts. It is possible to perform a phatic act without performing a rhetic act at all. This is done, for instance, by the peasant who says a Latin prayer without knowing the meaning of the words it contains, or the schoolboy who writes 'Balbus aedificat murum' as an exercise in grammar. But the difference between a phatic act and a rhetic act does not seem to be adequately made out if we simply say, with Austin, that in the rhetic act the words are used with a definite sense and reference. For one thing, as Austin himself notes, it is possible to perform a rhetic act without referring to anything. A speaker who says that all triangles have three sides does not refer to any triangle or to anything else. Further, it is possible for the sense and reference of all the words occuring in a pheme to be clear and yet for there to be doubt as to what, if any, rhetic act is being performed. When Macbeth reacted to lady Macbeth's murderous proposals with the hesitant words 'If we should fail'? she replied, 'we fail'. There is no doubt here of the reference of 'we' or the sense of 'fail', but it is an open question whether Lady Macbeth was asking a question, stating a fact, or simply echoing with scorn her husband's timorous utterance. For a pheme to be a rheme, it seems that it may lack reference, but that it must have not only sense but also, we might say, mood. The mood of a rheme is often made clear by the main verb of the sentence

> which reports the rhetic act. To ask or to order or to assert is to perform a rhetic act: the rheme produced by such an act will be respectively a question, a command, or a statement.(31)

R.L. Lanigan thinks that Austin's 'rheme' is a linguistic synergism, and it includes phone and pheme. The relationship between sense and reference suggests meaning, which is not present as merely sense, merely reference or merely the summary combination of sense and reference. The rheme is a unit of speech and not a unit of language. Austin's analysis of rheme confirms that the fault of a rheme is 'to be vague or void or obscure'. The three words are analogous and are used to describe relationships which are ambiguous, structures in which there is percieved sense and reference but in which neither has a relationship that is definite.

Now it is clear that Austin's phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts are to be considered and understood in relation to each other, which together constitute a locution or a locutionary act.

R.A. Lanigan declares that phonology is something that could deal with phonetic acts, similarly syntactics may deal with phatic acts and that semantics may involve rhetic acts.

But the classification itself has been controvertial. Walter Cerf in his classification of Austin's locutionary acts into phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts points to the nature of these acts. As we have already explained, phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts are dependent upon each other in a hierarchy. As some passages of How To Do Things with words suggest these three acts are meant to be subclasses within the class of locutionary acts - which is a sub-class of the whole speech act.

Walter Cerf says;

> One cannot utter words without making noises, but one can make noises without thereby uttering words. Words can be uttered that have no meaning, while meanings cannot be conveyed in speech without words being uttered. The suspicion arises that the phonetic act, the phatic act and the rhetic act are not subclasses, but parts of the locutionary act - as blossom, stem, leaf and root are parts and not classes of flowers. And this is what we find Austin to imply when he says (P.107) that 'the locutionary act embraces doing many things at once to be complete'. Phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts belong together, not like species of a genus, but like parts of a composite. They all have to flow together if a locutionary act is to come off.(32)

Though the hierarchy of dependences indicates otherwise, the phonetic act could exist in isolation from the other two acts, and the phatic act in isolation from the rhetic. But in isolation from each other they cannot make a locutionary act. As Austin emphasizes, a locutionary act is

any act of saying something in the full normal sense. That is why Austin says that phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts are inseperable parts and therefore are mere abstractions. All three acts are only aspect of a locutionary act. But Cerf expresses some reservations about this:

> I do not know if Austin's hiding the phonetic act under the 'etc'. is a symptom of some unconscious sort of behaviouristic commitment that made it difficult for him to lower the minimal observable core of the whole locutionary act to a mere abstraction.(33)

Thus, in any case, phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts are no longer parts of a whole, but abstract moments or aspects of the locutionary act. And without these aspects being present, the locutionary act is not a genuine complete act.

(a) LOCUTIONARY VS ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS

We have already distinguished a group of things we do in performing a locutionary act - i.e., phonetic, phatic, and rhetic acts. We have also established that the locutionary act is equivalent to uttering a sentence with a certain sense and reference, which classically is equivalent to 'meaning'. But as we shall see, the locutionary act itself cannot be a genuine and complete speech act in itself, unless it is related to the illocutionary act. Austin says,

> in general the locutionary act as much as the illocutionary act is an abstraction only: every genuine speech act is both. (This is similar to the way in which the phatic act, the rhetic act, & C., are mere abstractions) .(34)

We have also discussed Austin's slogan, 'To say something is to do something' in the context of performatives. Now we shall discuss this statement in terms of locutionary and illocutionary acts which are performed in our attempt to say something. Now let us see what comes out of the distinction between these two acts. But first let us try to define the illocutionary act involved in saying something.

Austin says,

> we also perform illocutionary acts such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, & c. i.e. utterances which have a certain (conventional) force .(35)

Austin's illocutionary act seems to be a modified form of performative act. The illocutionary act can be explained like this: Usually in our ordinary speech we use words to do something, i.e. to assert some fact or give some information, but often also to do certain other kinds of things. For example when we utter the words 'I opologize', we do not convey an information nor make a statement of fact, but apart from its vocabulary and grammar, we engage in a social ritual or convention, the point of which is to publicly or privately express regret for having committed some wrong action. To say 'I apologize' therefore, is not to describe anything or state a fact, but it is to perform the act of apologizing. Such acts Austin calls illocutionary acts.

In addition to the locutionary act the speaker would, Searle says,

> Characteristically have performed some acts within the class which includes informing or irritating or boring his hearer; he will further characteristically have performed acts within the class which includes refering to Kennedy or Khrushchev or the North pole: and he will also have performed acts within the class which includes making statements, asking questions, issuing commands, giving reports, greeting, and warning. The members of this last class are what Austin called illocutionary acts. ...(36)

Any linguistic communication obviously involves linguistic acts. It is not the symbol, word or sentence or even the token of symbol or word or sentence which is the

unit of linguistic communication, but it is production of the sentence token in the performance of the speech act that constitutes the basic unit of linguistic communication. Precisely, the production of the sentence token under certain conditions is the illocutionary act, and the illocutionary act is the minimal unit of linguistic communication. So far we have been dealing with how Austin and Searle define the term illocutionary act. Let us now examine how they distinguish between locutionary and illocutionary acts.

According to Austin,

> To perform a locutionary act is in general, we may say, also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act as I propose to call it. To determine what illocutionary act is so performed we must determine in what way we are using locution: asking or answering a question, giving some information or an assurance or a warning, announcing a verdict or an intention, pronouncing sentence, making an appointment or an appeal or a criticism, making an identification or giving a description, and the numerous like.(37)

Again Austin says,

> When we perform a locutionary act, we use speech: but in what way precisely are we using it on this occasion? For there are very numerous functions of or ways in which we use speech, and it makes a great difference to our act in some sense - sense (B) - in which way and which sense we were on this occasion 'using' it. It makes a great difference whether we were advising, or merely suggesting, or actually ordering, whether we were strictly promising or only announcing a vague intention, and so forth.(38)

Austin thinks we constantly debate these issues in terms of whether certain words or locutions have the force of a question, an order, or an announcement, or whether they ought to have been taken as an estimate and so on. Austin's point here is that there is an illocutionary variability within the locutionary constant.

Austin explains this sense of the performance of the 'illocutionary act', as the performance of an act in saying something as opposed to the performance of an act of saying something. This approach to the function of language Austin refers to as the doctrine of illocutionary force. Thus obviously Austin seems to stress the importance of the illocutions rather than the locutionary act, because he denies that all philosophical problems are as imagined by earlier philosophers, the problems of the 'locutionary usage'. Therefore he thinks that the "occasion of an utterance matters seriously", and the words used are to some extent to be explained by the context in which they have been spoken. With regard to the notion of 'meaning', Austin concedes that,

> Admittedly we can use 'meaning' also with reference to illocutionary force - 'He meant it as an order' & c. But I want to distinguish <u>force</u> and meaning in the sense in which meaning is equivalent to

> sense and reference, Just as it has become essnetial to distinguish sense and reference within meaning.(39)

Austin thinks that the word 'use' is as ambiguous and broad as the word 'meaning'. On a particular occasion we may clear up the 'use of a sentence'in the sense of a locutionary act, but we may not touch its use in the sense of an illocutionary act. Therefore, the expressions 'meaning' and 'use of sentence' blur the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts.

According to Austin both locutionary and illocutionary acts are conventional acts, e.g., doing obeisance. It is obeisance only because it is conventional. Or for example when we insinuate something in or by issuing an utterance, it is by convention that we insinuate towards a particular thing, but usually we do not say 'I insinuate'.

Mats Furberg says,

> Illocutionary acts are characterized by two closely connected features: (i) they are conventional - done as conforming to a convention, (ii) They are upto the speaker, in the sense that their successful performance does not demand any response from the audience other than a mere understanding of their convention - governed force, (103 and lectures IX, esp. 115-16). In both these respects they resemble locutionary acts and differ from perlocutionary ones.(40)

Furberg agrees with Austin that both locutionary and illocutionary acts are rule -governed acts-conforming to convention. An utterances locutionary dimension is governed by the conventions used in the rhetic act . These conventions govern the meaning of an utterance, in a language which has passed its initial stage, in its historical development independent of what the current speaker intends to say and what the uptake of the curent addressee would be in response to the speaker. For example, the English utterance, I like doing philosophy' simply means that the speaker likes doing philosophy. Its meaning is unaffected if someone happens to use these words when he actually intends to say that he likes doing philology; nor is it affected if a certain addressee understands the utterance in the latter sense.

According to Furburg, in a growing language there is a close connection betwen what a speaker intends with his cluster of noises and what those noises actually mean. Usually there are accepted rules which govern the use of the components of an utterance of a phone or at a later stage words resulting into a locutionary act. These rules are accepted only when the majority of language users observe them. Obviously when a speaker is well versed in an

established language in which he utters the sounds, he is used to, and knows the conventions governing the sounds and if he performs the utterance in a perfectly conscious state that is he is aware of the situations and circumstances, then his utterance or the noise or sound does have the meaning he intends - which usually results in a successful communication. The intentions such as warning etc, seem to have a prelinguistic dimension. Animals e.g. seem to make warning cries,threatening noises and so on. But Furberg points out that the issuance of an uterance with a locutionary dimension is upto the current speaker ... every act may not be conventional. And a distinction parallel to that between meaning or what the current speaker means or the hearer thinks is meant, has to be made in case of the illocutionary dimension. But Austin stresses the conventionality in the illocutionary acts which minimises the significance of the current hearer as well as the current speaker.

Again Furberg argues that if both locutionary and illocutionary acts are upto the speaker who knows the conventions of the language employed, in no sense can they be different. In Austin's writtings the answer to this question seems to be that the locutionary aspect is 'topic-directed' whereas the illocutionary aspect is 'audience-directed'. The terms 'topic-directed' and the 'audiance-directed' are

used by Strawson in the "Intention and convention in speech - acts". Let us take for example the utterance 'S is P'.Here the locutionary dimension is concerned with S andP; and the illocutionary dimension with guiding the audiance as to how what is said about S and P, is to be taken.

But for Austin, to perform an illocutionary act is necessarily to perform a locutionary act, e.g., to congratulate is necessarily to utter certain words and to say certain words is necessarily to utter certain noises and make certain more or less indescribable movements with the vocal organs. This points to the conclusion that whenever we say something, we perform both the locutionary and the illocutionary acts, except perhaps in the case of a mere exclamation like 'ouch' or 'damn'.

The locutionary-illocutionary distinction at first seems to be the direct off-shoot of the constative-performative distinction: Locutionary as the act of saying or the constative, and the illocutionary as the act of doing or performative. But Austin's stand is quite different on this matter. He claims that to state is as much to perform an illocutionary act as to warn or to pronounce or declare. Stating seems to meet all the criteria Austin gives for distinguishing the illocutionary act. For example,

> In saying that it was raining I was not betting or arguing or warning: I was simply stating it as a fact.(41)

Here stating is put absolutely at par with arguing, betting and warning. For example, 'I state that he did not do it', is exactly at par with, 'I argue that he did not do it', 'I bet that he did not do it' etc.

With the constative utterance in its simplest form of true and false we abstract from the illocutionary aspects of the speech act and we focus on the locutionary act. On the other hand with the performative utterance we pay much attention to the illocutionary force of the utterance. Austin, at the sametime believes that neither of the two abstractions are very useful, in the sense that they are not two seperate poles, but rather a historical development. For example, methmatical formulas may be the examples of constatives and the issuing of simple executive orders or giving of simple names may be the examples of performatives. Also examples of the kind 'I apologize' and 'the cat is on the mat' said for no particular reason suggest the idea of two distinct utterances. But at the end Austin feels the need to distinguish between the locutionary and the illocutionary. Therefore, Austin's locutionary/illocutionary distinction,

is the off-shoot of the constative/performative distinction. With the latter having the status of a special theory with respect to the former as a general theory. And the need for general theory arises simply because the traditional 'statement' is an abstraction. For stating is only one among many speech-acts of the illocutionary class, and in general every genuine speech act is both locutionary and illocutionary.

J.R. Searle in his article on "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts" categorically rejects Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts.

He says,

> IN ATTEMPTING to explore Austin's notion of an illocutionary act I have found his corresponding notion of a locutionary act very unhelpful and have been forced to adopt a quite different distinction between illocutionary acts and propositional acts.(42)

Searle thinks that the distinction between illocutionary acts and the propositional acts is more fruitful since it involves important philosophical issues like, 'nature of statements', how truth and falsehood is related to statements and the way what sentences mean, relates to what the speaker means when he utters a sentence'.

J.R. Searle's first objection to Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts is that it can not

be completely general in the sense of marking-off two mutually exclusive classes of acts, because meaning in Austin's sense determines the illocutionary force of a sentence.

He says,

> Uttering the sentence with a certain meaning is, Austin tells us, performing a certain locutionary act; uttering a sentence with a certain force is performing a certain illocutionary act; but where a certain force is part of the meaning, where the meaning uniquely determines a particular force, these are not two different acts but two different labels for the same act. Austin says that each is an abstraction from the total speech act, but the difficulty is that for a large class of cases - certainly all those involving the performative use of illocutionary verb - there is no way of abstracting the locutionary act which does not catch an illocutionary act with it.(43)

It is of course true that the concnept of an utterance with a certain meaning is different from the concept of an utterance with a certain force. But there are many sentences whose meaning is such as to determine that the serious utterance of the sentence with its literal meaning has a particular force, that is meaning determines the force of a sentence. Thus the class of illocutionary acts contains members of the class of locutionary acts. The concepts of meaning and force are different but they indicate overlapping classes for if the illocutionary verbs such as 'I pronounce', 'I declare', 'I give', etc; are used in a performative

sense, the attempt to abstract the locutionary meaning from the illocutionary force would be, Searle says, "like abstracting unmarried men from bechelors". The locutionary/ illocutionary distinction is not completely general because some locutionary acts are illocutionary acts. Later, we do find that Austin admits that all the members of the class of locutionary acts are members of the illocutionary class, because every rhetic act and hence every locutionary act is an illocutionary act; also that the conceptual difference is not sufficient to establish a distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts.

But Searle does tentatively conclude that there are two quite different distinctions hidden under the locutionary - illocutionary cloak - one between the meaning and the force of an utterance, and the other between a certain part of trying and succeeding in performing in performing an illocutionary act is, according to Searle the utterance of a sentence with a certain sense and reference and successfully performing off of illocutionary act. For example, I say, 'I hereby order you to leave', here the utterance has a distinction between the uttering of a sentence with a certain sense and reference and its success, that is I may have uttered the sentence to a person who did not hear me and

therefore, the act of performing an illocutionary act of ordering is unsuccessful, but still it is a locutionary act. But Searle's use of the words "locutionary - illocutionary cloak", itself gives the concept of oneness of the two different acts. So we may say that these are (locutionary - illocutionary) the internal parts of a total speech act. Here the question arises that if we take the total speech act in Austin's sense, it involves three subacts - locutionary, illocutionary and the perlocutionary. And Searle's point of trying and succeeding in the performance of an illocutionary act reflects the perclocutionary aspect of the speech act. Therefore, it is misleading to say that the part of trying and succeeding can be related to the performance of an illocutionary act, because it is not the case that the illocutionary utterance e.g., 'shut the door' has not been performed successfully, if the hearer does not respond to the order and leaves the door open. But still the illocutionary act has been performed by the speaker.

Secondly, Searle points out an inconsistency in Austin's use of direct and indirect quotation, which he calls '<u>oratio recta</u>' and '<u>oratio obliqua</u>'. In one place Austin uses them to distinguish between the subacts of locutionary act-phatic and rhetic act-such that the phatic is identified with the oratio recta and the rhetic with the

oratio olique. In another place, he uses the same distinction to contrast the locutionary and the illocutionary acts.

Let us quote Searle:

> Prima facie it seems inconsistent to identify the locutionary act on one page by the use of direct quotation, contrasting it with the illocutionary act which is identified by the use of indirect quotation, and then on another page to identify the rhetic part of the locutionary act by the use of indirect quotation, contrasting it with another part of the locutionary act, the phatic act, which is identified by the use of direct quotation.(44)

Searle's charge in this cannection against Austin is that in characterizing rhetic acts, we inadvertantly characterizes them as illocutionary acts. Because the verbs in Austin's examples of indirect speech - reports of rhetic acts are all illocutionary verbs of a very general kind, which stand in relation to the verbs in his reports of illocutionary verbs. Therefore, Searle thinks that there are no rhetic acts as opposed to the illocutionary acts. For there are phonetic acts of uttering certain noises, phatic acts of uttering certain vocables and the illocutionary act such as making statements, asking questions etc, but it does not seem that there are acts of using those vocables or words in a meaningful utterance, which are not already

illocutionary acts. So a rhetic act is always an illocutionary act of one or the other kind. Thus the distinction between mutually exclusive classes of locutionary and illocutionary acts collapses.

(b) LOCUTIONARY VS ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE

After explaining locutionary and illocutionary acts, Austin refers to the doctrine of the different types of functions of language, which he calls the 'illocutionary force'. By illocutionary force is meant that the occasion of an utterance matters seriously and the words we use are explained by the context in which they are spoken, in a linguistic interchange. Philosophers have been explaining these problems in terms of 'the meaning of words' quite mistakenly. But Austin thinks that we could use 'meaning' also with reference to illocutionary force and tries to distinguish force and meaning in terms, in which meaning is equivalent to sense and reference, just as, it has become essential to distinguish sense and reference within meaning.

On the other hand Searle thinks that the sentence or utterances used to perform elementary speech acts have the symbolic form f(P), where f indicates illocutionary force and P the propositional content - so an illocutionary act has the logical form F(P). Illocutionary force is a function of the meaning of F.

As we have already (in our previous section) seen Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts collapses. But there still remains a distinction between

the literal meaning of a sentence and the intended force of its utterance. Here again Searle contends that the distinction between what the sentence means and what the speaker means in its utterance (literal and intended) has no special relevance to the general theory of illocutionary forces, because intended illocutionary force is only one of the aspects in which the speaker's meaning may go beyond literal sentence meaning. But the question here arises as to why Austin ultimately depends on the illocutionary force of an utterance though he himself confesses to be equally unhappy with its classification.

He says;

> We said long ago that we needed a list of 'explicit performative verbs'; but in the light of the more general theory we now see that what we need is a list of illocutionary forces of an utterance. The old distinction, however, between primary and explicit performatives will survive the sea-change from the preformative-constative distinction to the theory of speech-acts quite successfully. For we have since seen reason to support that the sorts of test suggested for the explicit performative verbs (to say ..... is to..., & c) will do, and in fact do better for sorting out those verbs which make explicit, as we shall now say, the illocutionary force of an utterance, or what illocutionary act it is that we are performing in issuing that utterance.(45)

Thus by illocutionary force we mean, the explicit performativeness as compared to the meaning of an utterance.

Austin classifies the utterances according to their illocutionary force as follows:-

1. Verdictives
2. Exercitives
3. Commisives
4. Behabitives (a shocker this)
5. Expositives[46]

1. Verdictives: are judgements or decisions given by a jury, an arbitrator or an umpire. Austin thinks these are necessarily decisions of fact or Value, on the basis of reasons or evidences. Verdictives are obviously connected with truth and falsity as regards soundness and unsoundness or fairness and unfairness. The logical inference of a verdict is shown for example, in a dispute over an umpire's calling 'out', 'three strikes', or 'four balls'. The other examples of verdictives according to Austin are:

"acquit	Convict	find (as a matter of fact)
hold (as a matter of a law)	interpret as	understand

read it as	rule	calculate
reckon	estimate	locate
place put it at	date make it	measure take it
grade	rank	rate
assess	value	describe
characterize	diagnose	analyse"(47)

2. Exercitives: According to Austin, these "are the exercising of powers, rights or influence. Examples are appointing, voting, ordering, urging, warning etc."(48)

According to Austin, in issuing of an exercitive the speaker (a judge or an arbitrator) gives a decision or judgement in favour of or against a certain course of an action. It is a decision or judgement that something is to be so; as distinct from the judgement that something is so; it is an award as opposed to an assessment. It is usually a sentence as opposed to a verdict and constitutes a very wide class. Exccercitives are the executions of the acts official or unofficial in an ordinary discourse or excercising of powers by an official. They cover a large class of acts. Let us mention some of them from Austin's list of Excercitives;

"appoint	degrade	denote
dismiss	excommunicate	name
order	command	direct
sentence	fine	grant
Levy	vote for	nominate
choose	claim	give"(49)

3. **Commissives** :are simply those actions which commit us to do something, that is, certain actions. These are indicated by 'promising' or 'undertaking' etc; but they also include declarations of the intention which are not promises e.g.; espousals. Thus obviously they are connected to verdictives and exercitives.

Austin justifies his point as to how the declarations of intention and undertakings can be classed together - though, they are apparently different. This is so because both are covered by the primary performative "shall", thus we have locutions "shall probably", "shall do my best to" etc - which in a sense result into commitments.

In the descriptions at the one extreme we may just state that 'I have an intention', but we may also declare or announce our intention. For example, the utterance, 'I

declare my intention' does commit us to say 'I intend' which is generally to declare. Commissives are such acts where we not only state, but also announce; e.g., favour, oppose or adopt the view. To say 'I favour X' may be in the context of voting for X, or of espousing X, or of applauding X.

Austin says,

> the whole point of commissives is to commit the speaker to a certain course of action. Examples are:

promise	covenant	contract
undertake	bind myself	give my word
am determined to	intend	declare my
mean to	plan	intention purpose (50)

4. **Behabitives** : Behabitives deal with the attitudes and social behaviour of people, e.g., apologizing, congratulating, cursing or challenging etc. Behabitives include people's behaviours and attitudes when they react to other's behaviours or attitudes in connection with their own past or present conduct. Obviously these utterances are connected with both stating or describing what our feelings are. Austin gives the following list of examples:-

1. For apologies we have 'apologize'
2. For thanks we have 'thank'.

3. For sympathy we have 'deplore', 'commiserate', 'compliment', 'condole', congratulate', 'felicitate', 'sympathize'.

4. For attitudes we have 'resent' 'don't mind', 'pay tribute', 'criticize', 'gumble about', 'complain of; 'applaud', 'overlook', 'commend', 'deprecate', and the non-exercitive uses of 'blame', 'approve', and 'favour'.

5. For greetings we have 'welcome', 'bid you farewell'.

6. For wishes we have 'bless', 'curse', 'toast', 'drink to', and 'wish' (in its strict performative use).

7. For challenges we have 'dare', 'defy', 'protest', challenge'.(51)

5. Expositives : Expositives are, generally speaking, those acts which expose and make plain how our utterances fit into the course of an argument, or conversation - these are how we use the words, e.g., we say, 'I reply', 'I argue', 'I concede', 'I illustrate', 'I conclude' etc. It can be the clarification of arguments, usages and references. Austin says that we may dispute as to whether these are not verdictives, exercitives, behabitives or commissives as well. We may also dispute whether they are not straight descriptions of our feelings, practices etc, especially of suiting the action to the words, as we say 'I turn next to', 'I quote', 'I cite', 'I repeat' etc.

The list of the examples of expositives as given by Austin is as follow:-

1. affirm
   deny
   state
   describe
   class
   identify
2. remark
   mention
   interpose
3. inform
   apprise
   tell
   answer
   rejoin

3a. ask
4. testify
   report
   swear
   conjecture
   doubt
   know
   believe
5. accept
   concede
   withdraw
   agree
   demur to
   object to
   adhere to
   recognise
   repudiate

5a. correct
   revise (52)

Austin compares all five acts of verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives and the expositives with each other showing that they are all interdependent and are interrelated as far as their applicability is concerned.

For e.g., the behabitives like 'congratulate' may imply a verdict about value or someone's character, and similarly the word 'blame' which is equivalent to 'hold responsible' is a verdictive, but in another sense it is to form an attitude towards a person and is thus a behabitive. Similar is the case with all other acts according to Austin.

David Holdcroft, in his article on'Meaning and Illocutionary acts', points out that the taxonomy of Austin's illocutionary force is open to criticism.Because most of the constituents of his first and fifth classes do not qualify for their membership. For example, in the case of verdictives, which are judgements, or decisions by a Jury or an umpire on the basis of evidence, Holdcroft points out two elements in Austin's classification e.g. 'grading' and 'ranking' very trival.

He says,

> While, it may be possible to perform some of the acts mentioned in this class without using any language at all e.g. the acts of grading, or ranking, it seems to me so unclear that more than a few such acts could be independently identified under a full description ..... (53)

On the other hand in the case of expositives, which in Austin's sense, clarify how our utterances fit into the course of a communication and the class includes such acts as stating, affirming, denying, questioning, answering and

illustrating, which cannot be performed without saying something .

> ... there are some marginal cases such as withdrawing, objecting or correcting, they are sufficiently few for it to be reasonable for me to ignore all the members of this class also .(54)

Here Holdcraft seems to misunderstand the total context of Austin's discussion. Austin's discussion centres around the possible kinds of speech acts which means that the whole discourse is located within the domain of language.

Further, it is true that some speech acts have no non-linguistic equivalents or substitutes. For example stating, afferming, denying etc.But there are cases where a speech act has non linguistic equivalents or substitutes also, 'grading' comes under this category. But so do several other acts such as warning or objecting, which may be adequately performed by raising a finger or shaking one's head or some other gestures. But that these acts can have non-linguistic equivalents is irrelevent to their status or categorization as speech acts. So, Holdcroft's point that grading can be performed non-linguistically does not appear to have any relevance as a criticism of Austin's classification of illocutionary acts.

Holdcroft again points out that the behabitives such as apologizing, thanking, deploring, congratulating and welcoming, include the reaction to other people's behaviour and fortunes, attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone's past or present conduct.

He argues,

> There is no doubt that most, if not all, behabitives can be performed without saying anything. What is less clear is whether apart from very simple acts of this kind, e.g. welcoming, biding someone farewell, applauding a performance, that many of these acts could be independently identified. Thus, if I congratulate you on your recent appointment by uttering the words 'congratulations on your appointment', and clapping you on your back, the utterance of the words does seem to play a fairly crucial role in making it clear what it is I am congratulating you for and how the pat on the back is to be taken. It is true that this role cannot be described as essential. I could conceivably congratulate you on your appointment without uttering these or any other words. But then it does seem that the situation would have to be structured in a certain way and that the utterance of some sentence or other would play a crucial role in doing this: i.e. if you say 'I 've got the job' and wordlessly I clap you on the back, then doubtless in most cases I will be taken to be congratulating you for getting the job. But someone who did'nt understand the setence 'I 've got the job' could hardly be expected to realize that this was what I was doing - so even in this case an ability to understand a sentence seems to be necessary to identify the act performed. And it seem to me that the identification of the great majority of all but the most simple behabitives will involve the use of semantic information.(55)

The other two classes of exercitives and commissives, are similarly liable to such criticism. Here Holdcraft points out that the distinction between these is not clear,

> ...since many acts Austin classes as exercitives obviously commit one to courses of action, though not all do ... It is clear, I think, that a large number of exercitivies and an appreciable number of commissives can be performed without saying anything. Thus I can order you to leave by pointing, excommunicate you by making a ritual gesture, or warn you by flapping my arms; and I can embrace your cause by standing under your banner. However, once again apart from very simple acts of either kind it is very unclear that a large number could be independently identified - though in case of excrecitives it does seem likely that more relatively complex acts might be independently identified than in the case of any other classes, e.g. the acts of ordering (commanding) some one to shut the door, ordering (commanding) someone to leave the room, or warning someone that the bull is dangerous.(56)

Austin's taxonomy of illocutionary acts has been criticized a lot; but let us confine ourselves to Searle's discussion of the weaknesses in Austin's classification.

Searle thinks that Austin's taxonomy of illocutionary force is tentative and can be taken only as a basis for discussion but not as an established principle for further advancement. But at the sametime the whole taxonomy needs to be seriously revised because it has several weaknesses.

Firstly, Searle points out that they are not the classifications of illocutionary acts but of English illocutionary verbs. Classification of different verbs cannot be a classification of ilocutionary acts. Some verbs may mark the manner in which an illocutionary act is performed e.g., "announce". One may announce orders, promises, and reports, but announcing is not at all ordering, promising or reporting. Announcing is not the name of the type of illocutionary act but the way, the manner, in which some illocutionary act is performed.

Searle says that even if we grant and label them as illocutionary verbs, still one can level the following significant criticisms againt it:

(i) that the taxonomy is hardly based on any clear and systemamtic set of rules.

(ii) Austin is only clear in the case of commissives, using the illocutionary point as the basis of the definition of a category.

(iii) Expositives seem to have been defined in terms of discourse relations.

(iv) Exercitives seem to have been defined at least partly, in terms of the exercise of authority. Both considerations of status as well as institutional considerations are lurking in it.

(v) Behabitives do not seem at all to be well defined, but it seems that they involve notions of what is good or bad for the speaker and the hearer, in the sense of the way the utterance relates to the interests of the speaker and hearer as it involves the expressions of the attitudes.

Searle further contends that the classification rules are unsystematic. He justifies his point by takig the example of the verb "describe" - a significant verb in speech acts - that Austin lists both as a verdictive and an expositive. Although Austin tries to justify his dual inclusion of this verb, Searle argues that it is not a convincing justification.

> But then any "act of exposition involving the expounding of views", could also in his rather special sense be "the delivering of a finding, official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons". And indeed, a look at his list of expositives (pp. 161-2) is sufficient to show that most of his verbs fit his definition of verdictives as well as does "describe". Consider "affirm", "deny", "state", "class" "identify", "conclude", and "deduce". All of these are listed as expositive, but they could just as easily have been listed as verdictives.(57)

Those cases which are not clearly verdictives are where the meaning of the verb has purely to do with the

discourse relations, e.g., 'began by' 'turn to' or where reasons or evidence are not needed, e.g. 'postulate', 'neglect', 'call' etc. But that is not sufficient to assert a separate category, since many of these - 'begin by', 'turn' to 'neglect' are not names of illocutionary acts at all.

Searle points out that in Austin's taxonomy, categories not only overlap but there are within some of the categories diverse kinds of verbs.

Searle says,

> Thus Austin lists "dare", "defy" and "challenge", alongside "thank", "apologize", "deplore" and "welcome" as behabitives. But "dare", "defy" and "challenge" have to do with the hearer's subsequent actions, they belong with "order", "command" and "forbid" both on syntactical and semantic grounds, ... But when we look for the family that includes "order", "command" and "urge" we find that these are listed as exercitives alongside "veto", hire* and "demote".(58)

But Searle thinks that these also are in two quite different categories. The verbs listed within the classes do not satisfy the definitions given, even if the definitions are taken in a loose suggestive sense. Thus the verbs 'nominate', 'appoint' and 'excommunicate' are not 'giving

---

* "Hire is probably a misprint for "fine" Austin's list in HTD - 1962, does not include the word "Hire".

of a judgement or decision in favour of or against a certain course of action', nor are they advocacies. They are rather performances of these actions but not advocacies of anything. We may agree on a point that ordering, commanding and urging someone to do something are all cases of advocating that he do it, but nominating or appointing are in no conceivable sense tantamount to advocating. For example, when I appoint someone Chairman, I do'nt advocate that he be or become chairman: I make him chairman. Searle sums up his criticisms on Austin's taxonomy of illocutionary acts saying:

> In sum, there are (at least) six related difficulties with Austin's taxonomy; in ascending order of importance: there is a persistent confusion between verbs and acts, not all the verbs are illocutionary verbs, there is too much overlap of the categories, too much heterogeneity within the categories many of the verbs listed in the categories don't satisfy the definition given for the category and, most important, there is no consistent principle of classification.(59)

Elaborating on his criticism of Austin's classification of illocutionary acts, Searle presents five alternatives as a basis of constructing a taxonomy. But before discussing his supplant taxonomy it is necessary to discuss the components of illocutionary force, as given by Searle. Searle points out that the illocutionary acts like all other human acts can succeed or fail. Therefore, one way to understand the notion of illocutionary act is in terms of the conditions of its successful and non-defective

performance. For example, an act of excommunication can be successful only if the speaker has an authority to excommunicate and not otherwise.

As already mentioned in the concluding remarks of our discussion of the constative-performative distinction, Searle's notion of "successful and non-defective" speech acts is a substitute for Austin's theory of "felicitous and infelicitous" speech acts. For Searle, an ideal speech act is...

> both successful and non-defective, and for each illocutionary force the components of illocutionary force serve to determine under what conditions that type of speech act is both successful and non-defective , at least as far as its illocutionary force is concerned.(60)

Searle offers sevens compontents of illocutionary force which constitute a nondefective illocutionary act.

Seven Components of Illocutionary Force:

1. Illocutionary point: Each type of illocution has a purpose, intrinsic to it's being an act of that type. This illocutionary purpose or point according to Searle, is a very significant condition for the utterance to be successful and non-defective.

> Each type of illocution has a point or purpose which is internal to its being an act of that type. The point of statements and descriptions is to tell the people how things are, the point of promises and vows is to commit the speaker to doing something, the point of orders and commands is to try to get people to do things, and so on. Each of these points or purposes we will call the illocutionary point of the corresponding act.(61)

A successful performance of an act of that type necessarily achieves that purpose and it achieves it in virtue of being an act of that type. It could not be a successful act of that type if it did not achieve that purpose. Fox example, in our daily life, a speaker may have all sorts of purposes e.g., in making a promise one may want to reassure his hearer, keep the communication going on, or try to appear to be very clever, but none of these is part of the essence of promising, But on making a promise one necessarily commits oneself to doing something. This type of purpose of promising is intrinsic and if one performs the act of promising successfully, then one necessarily commits oneself to doing something, because that is the illocutionary point of the act of promising. Generally, the illocutionary point of a type of illocutionary act is that purpose which is essential to its being of that type. This has the consequence that if the act is successful, the point is achieved. The illocutionary point of promise to do the act, 'A' is to commit the speaker to doing A. On the other hand,

the illocutionary point of say an apology for having done act A, is to express the speaker's sorrow or regret for having done the act A.

According to Searle, different illocutionary forces can have the same illocutionary point or purpose, e.g. in the pairs, "assertion-testimony, order-request, promise-vow" etc. In each couple both illocutionary forces have the same purpose, but differ in other respects. Therefore, the basic component of illocutionary force, as pointed out by Searle, is the "illocutionary point or purpose".

2. Degree of Strength of the Illocutionary point:

There is a degree of strength in achieving the illocutionary point. For example, 'request' cannot be as strong as 'insist', or on the other hand if we express regret for having done something wrong our utterance has lesser strength than if we 'humbly apologize', for having commited a wrong. For each type of illocutionary force, whose illocutionary point requires to be achieved by a certain degree of strength, we usually call that degree of strength, the characteristic 'degree of strength of illocutionary point of F,' or force.

3. Mode of achievement:

According to Searle some of the illocutionary acts require a special set of conditions under which their illocutionary point has to be achieved in the performance of the speech act. For example, the two utterances of 'command' and 'request' have the same illocutionary point - but one who issues the command as having an authority to command, does more than a speaker who issues an utterance of a request. The command achieves the illocutionary purpose by invoking the position of authority of the speaker. In order to have a successful command, the speaker must not only have an authority but must be invoking his authority in issuing the utterance. Similarly, a person who makes a statement as a witness in a court trial does not merely make a statement but testifies it, and his status as witness is what makes his utterance count as testimony. These features which distinguish e.g. commanding and testifying, from requesting and asserting, Searle calls "modes of achievement" of their illocutionary point.

4. Propositional Content Conditions:

According to Searle most of the illocutionary acts have the form F(P), and in many cases the type of force F will impose certain conditions on what can be in the propositional

content, P. For example in promising, the content of the promise must be that the speaker will perform some course of action in future. One cannot promise that someone else in future will do something and one cannot promise that he or she has done something in the past. Similarly, an apology must be something for which the speaker is responsible, e.g. a speaker cannot successfully apologize for the law of "modus ponens" or "elliptical orbit of planets". Such conditions of the propositional content, imposed by the illocutionary force 'F (P)' form, Searle calls "propositional content conditions".

5. Prepratory Conditions:

Searle believes that there are certain other conditions also which must be met to obtain a successful and nondefective type of illocutionary act. For example, if a promise is successfully made and has achieved its' illocutionary point or purpose, it would still be defective if a certain thing promised by the speaker is uninteresting for the hearer and certainly is not the thing the hearer wanted him or her to do. In making a promise the speaker presupposes that he or she can do the promised act, except for the fact the promising presupposes the capacity to fulfill it, the other points appear irrelevant, and that the action is in the

interest of the hearer. Similarly, an apology can be made only when the speaker-hearer believes that the thing the aplogy is sought for is bad or wrong. These necessary conditions for the successful and nondefective performance of an illocutionary act, Searle calls, prepratory conditions. In the performance of a speech act the speaker presupposes the satisfaction of all the prerparatory conditions. These conditions determine two classes of presuppositions: those peculiar to illocutionary force and the other peculiar to the propositional content. To illustrate his point Searle picks up some famous paradigms:

> To take some famous examples the assertion that the king of France is bald presupposes that there exists a king of France; and the question whether you have stoppedbeating your wife presupposes both that you have a wife and that you have been beating her. Regardless of which of the various philosophical accounts one accepts of these sorts of prepositions, one needs to distinguish them from those that derive from illocutionary forces. The same propositional presuppositions can occur wth different illocutionary forces, as, for example, one can both ask whether and one can assert that Jones has stopped beating his wife.(62)

6. Sincerity Conditions:

Searle seems to signify the propositional content in most of the components of illocutionary force as is obvious in fifth component of illocutionary acts also; he says

> Speakers and hearers internalize the rules that determine prepratory conditions and thus the rules are reflected in the psychology of speakers-hearers. But the states of affairs specified by the rules need not themselves be psychological .(63)

Here again, in this component the propositional content is very vivid. Searle says that in any performance of an illocutionary act with a propositional content, a speaker expresses a certain Psychological state with the same content. For example,

> when one makes a statement one expreses a belief, when one makes a promise one expreses an intention, when one issues a command one expresses a desire or want .(64)

Thus the propositional content of the illocutionary act is in general identical with the propositional content of the expressed psychological state. But this does not mean that preparatory conditions are psychologial states of the speaker, they are rather circumstantial states of affairs. This expression of the Psychological state that one does or does not have, distinguishes the sincerity or insincerity in speech acts. An

insincere speech act involves the expression of a Psychological state , even though the speaker does not have that state of mind. For example, an insincere apology is one where the sorrow expressed, is not in his mind or an insincere promise is one where the speaker actually does not intend to do the things he promises to do. Thus according to Searle, an insincere speech act can be defective but not unsuccessful. For example, a lie can be a successful utterance or assertion but it is defective because the speaker is intentionaly insincere.

The truth that the expression of the Psychological state is internal to the performance of the illocution, is obvious by the fact that it is self-contradictory to perform an illocution and simultaneously deny that one has the corresponding psychological state, e.g. one cannot say, 'I promise to come but I do not intend to come', or 'I apologize but I am not sorry',etc. Searle believes that the 'expression' of sincerity condition, is the expression of one's feelings and attitudes.

7. Degree of Strength of the sincerity conditions:

Searle says that just as the same illocutionary purpose can be achieved with different degrees of strength, similarly, the same psychological state can be expressed with

different degrees of strength. For example, a speaker who makes a request expresses the desire that the hearer does the act requested of him or her, but if he or she, "begs, beseeches, or implores", he/she expresses a stronger desire than in a simple request. Often the degree of strength of the sincerity condition and the degree of strength of the illocutionary point vary directly. An illocutionary act of e.g., 'ordering' has a greater degree of strength of its illocutionary point than a request, even though it need not have a greater degree of strength of its expressed intention or psychological state.The greater degree of strength of the illocutionary point of ordering derives from the mode of achievement. The person who gives the order must invoke his position of authority over the hearer. Searle concludes by saying.

> In cases where illocutionary force requires that the psychological state be expressed with a degree of strength, we will call that degree of strength the characteristic degree of strength of the sincerity condition .(65)

Thus the discussion of the components of illocutionary force, as propounded by Searle enables us to define the notion of illocutionary force. An illocutionary force is uniquely determined once its illocutionary point, preparatory conditions, the mode of achievement of its illocutionary

point, the degree of strength of its illocutionary point, its prorpositional content conditions, its sincerity conditions, and the degree of strength of its sincerity conditions, are satisfied.

Now Searle in his supplant taxonomy (to that of Austin's taxonomy) of illocutionary acts regards his classification as dealing with the basic categories of illocutions. And at the same time he believes that by presenting an alternative he can add greater clarity to his critique of Austin's classification. He takes the illocutionary point, its corollaries, direction of fit and expressed sincerity as a basis for constructing a classification.

Searle classifies the illocutionary acts, in relation to that of Austin's into "Assertives", "Directives", "commissives" "Expressives" and "Declarations".

> **1. Assertives:** Searle says, "The point or purpose of the members of the assertive class is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something's being the case, to the truth of the exprssed proposition. All of the members of the assertive class are assessable on the dimension of assessment which includes true and false.(66)

Searle uses Frege's assertion-sign to mark the illocutionary point and symbolizes this class as, 1- (P). The direction of fit or match is of words to the world and

the psychological state expressed is Belief (That P). The words such as "belief" and "commitment" are intended to mark dimensions rather then determinents. Thus, there is a difference on the one hand, between suggesting that P or hypothesizing that P, and on the other hand between insisting that P or swearing that P. The degree of belief or commitment may approach or even reach zero, but it is clear that hypothesizing that P and simply stating that P are in the same line of business in a manner which makes them different from requesting. Once the existence of assertives as a seperate class is recognized; based on the notion of illocutionary purpose, the large number of performative verbs that denote illocutions, mark features of illocutionary force which are additional to illocutionary point. For example, the words, 'boast' and 'complain' denote assertions with the added feature that they have something to do with the interest of the speaker. The words, 'conclude' and 'deduce' also are assertives but with the added feature, that they mark certain relations between the assertive illocutionary acts and the rest of the discourse. Searle says ;

> This class will contain most of Austin's expositives and many of his verdictives as well for the, by now I hope obvious, reason that they all have the same illocutionary point and differ only in other features of illocutionary force. The

> simplest test of an assertive is this: can you literally characterize it (inter alia) as true or false.(67)

2. Directives:

The illocutionary point of the directives consists, according to Searle, in the fact that they are attempts (of varying degrees, and hence, more precisely, they are determinates of the determinable which includes attempting) by the speaker to get the hearer to do something. They may be very modest "attempts" as when I invite you to do it or suggest that you do it, or they may be very fierce attempts as when I insist that you do it using the shriek mark for the illocutionary point indicating device for the members of this class generally, we have the following symbolism:

"! ↑ W(H does A)".

Here the direction of fit or match is world-to-words and the sincerity condition is want, wish or desire. The propositional content in these classes is always that the hearer H does some future action A. Denoting verbs of directives are ask, order, command, request, beg, plead, pray entreat', and also invite, permit and advise. Searle thinks that Austin's list of behabitives like dare, defy and challenge reside in this class. Many of Austin's exercitives are also in this class. Searle says that questions are a

subclass of directives, since they are the attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to answer the question, i.e., to perform a speech act.

3. Commissives:

Searle points out that many verbs which Austin lists as commisive verbs do not belong to this class at all, e.g. the word "shall", "intend", "favour" etc. He says,

> Commissives then are those illocutionary acts whose point is to commit the speaker (again in varying degrees) to some future course of action. Using "C" for the members of this class generally, we have the following symbolism.
>
> "C ↑ I (S does A)".

The direction of fit is world-to-word and the sincerity condition is Intention. The propositional content is always that the speaker does some future action A .(68)

4. Expressives:

The illocutionary point of expressives is, Searle says

> ... to express the Psychological state specified in the propositional content. The paradigms of expressive verbs are "thank", "Congratulate", "apologize", "condole", "deplore", and "welcome".(69)

Searle believes that expressives have no direction of fit, because the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed. For example, if A apologizes for having stepped on B's toe, A's purpose is not to claim that B's toe was stepped on nor to get it stepped on. Let us take up the syntactical paradigm expressive verbs, which in their performative occurance will not take that - clauses but require a gerundive nominalization transformation e.g., one cannot say:

I apologize that I stepped on your toe: the correct English sentence would be, I apologize for stepping on your toe. Similarly one cannot say:

> "I congratulate you that you won the race", one must say, "I congratulate you on winning the race", or "congratulations on winning the race".(70)

These syntactical facts, Searle suggests are consequences of the fact that there is no direction of fit in expressives. In an expressive, the truth of the proposition is presupposed. Therefore its symbolization must proceed as,

"E $\emptyset$ (P) (S-H+ property)"

Here "E" indicates that the illocutionary purpose common to all expressives "$\emptyset$" is a void symbol indicating no direction of fit. "p" is a variable ranging over the

different possible psychological states, and the propositional content ascribes some property either to the speaker or the hearer.

For example, I can congratulate you not on winning the race but on your good looks also. However, the property specified in the propositional content of an expressive must be related to the speaker or the hearer.

5. Declarations: Searle says,

> It is the defining characteristic of this class that the successful performance of one of its members brings about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality, successful performance guarantees that the propositional content corresponds to the world: if I successfully perform the act of appointing you chairman, then you are chairman; if I successfully perform the act of nominating you as candidate, then you are a candidate; if I successfully perform the act of declaring a state of war, then war is on: if I successfully perform the act of marying you, then you are married.[71]

Searle thinks that declarations bring about some change in the condition or states of the object referred to, in virtue of the fact that the declaration has been successfully performed. This feature distinguishes declarations from other categories. As we have seen in our exposition of Austin's performative/ constative distinction, declarations are obviously treated as performance, but Searle points out, that the distinctive feature of declarations has not been properly understood. Searle says that what he calls as

declarations, are included in Austin's - class of performatives; that is why Searle calls his class of declarations as a special category of speech acts. The symbolic structure of declarations would be: "D $\Updownarrow$ $\emptyset$(P)". 'D' indicates the declarational illocutionary point, the direction of fit is both words-to-world and world-to words, but there is a null symbol in the sincerity condition and a usual propositional variable 'p' is used.

Part III

(a) ILLOCUTIONARY VS PERLOCUTIONARY ACTS

Now let us look back to our earlier discussion of locutionary-illocutionary distinction, in which we talked about Austin's two senses- sense A (locution) and sense B (illocution) involved in the performance of an act of saying something i.e., a speech act. Austin believes that there is another sense C, of the performance of an act of saying "in which to perform a locutionary act and therein an illocutionary act, may also be to perform an act of another kind"-(72) i.e., the perlocutionary act.

Let act us consider Austin's examples for distinguishing the three acts-locutionary, illocutationary and perlocutionary respectively: (E.2)

Act (A) or Locution
He said to me, 'you can't do that'
Act (B) or Illocution
He protested against my doing it.
Act (C.a) or Perlocution
He pulled me up, checked me,
Act (C.b)
He stopped me, he brought me to my senses, & c.
He annoyed me.(73)

In Austin's scheme, a speech act is obviously incomplete without the perlocutionary act. And his contention is that

> saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience, or of the speaker or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them; and we may then say, thinking of this, that the speaker has performed an act in the nomenclature of which reference is made either (c.a.) only obliquely, or even (c.b.) not at all, to the performance of the locutionary or illocutionary act. We shall call the performance of an act of this kind the performance of a perlocutionary act or perlocuton.(74)

Again, Austin says.

> Thirdly, we may also perform perlocutionary acts, what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, detering, and even, say surprising or misleading .(75)

It is evident that in Austin's speech act theory, the perlocutionary is a crucial component, although Austin does not seem to put it on exactly the same footing as the locutionary and illocutionary aspects. However, the point to be noted is that the relation between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary is more complex and more problematic than the relation of the illocutionary with the locutionary act.

So, before going into the details of the nature of the perlocutionary act itself, it may be worthwhile to look at its relation to the illocutionary act.

We can distinguish the illocutionary act, e.g. 'he argued that ...' from the perlocutionary act, e.g. 'he convinced me that ...' It shows that the illocutionary is conventional whereas the perlocutionary is not, in the same sense a conventional act. In saying, 'he argued that ...' shows that the speaker performs an act of argument, it is so called by virtue of certain conventions going various forms discourse. Whereas the utterance 'he convinced me that ...' is an act which involves the effect or the consequences of convincing on a particular subject, by the speaker, i.e. the utterance has the effect of convincing the audience, which is not conventional, in so far it is more of a causal relation. The illocutionary act is said to be coventional in the sense that it could be made explicit by the performative formula, but the perlocutinary cannot. Thus in an illocutionary act we can say, 'I argue that', or 'I warn you that', but not 'I convince you' or 'I alarm you'. The acts of warning (illocutionary) or the acts of convincing (perlocutionary) can be performed or brought-off non-verbally, but even then, Austin believes that the illocutionary act, e.g.; of warning must be a conventional

non-verbal act e.g. by swinging a stick. However, although the perlocutionary acts are themselves not conventional acts, conventional acts may be made use of in order to bring off a perlocutionary act. For exmple, a judge may decide, by hearing what was said, what locutionary and illocutionary acts were performed, but not what perlocutionary acts were achieved.

(b) SAYING AND DOING THROUGH SPEECH

Austin gives a formula for distinguishing the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. He says, "In saying X I was doing y' or 'I did y', 'By saying X I did y' or 'I was doing y'".(76)

With these formulas Austin tries to distinguish between the illocutionary verbs i.e. '<u>In saying</u>", with the perlocutionary verbs, i.e., '<u>by saying</u>. For exmaple, 'In saying I would shoot him I was threatening him'. 'By saying I would shoot him I alarmed him'.

But the formula seems to give trouble for two reasons: First 'In saying X I was doing y', is not confined to illocutionary acts only. It seems applicable to the locutionary as well as perlocutionary acts. For example, 'In saying "Iced ink" I was uttering the noises "I stink", or besides these there are other miscellaneous cases such as 'In saying X you were making a mistake or 'running a risk'; to make a mistake Austin says is certainly not to perform an illocutionary act nor, for that matter, a locutionary act.

But the fact that it is not confined to illocutionary acts may be taken care of by arguing that 'saying' is ambiguous, that 'saying' can be replaced by 'speaking of' or 'using the expression or instead of 'in saying x' we could say 'by the word x'. But here also, the perlocutionary act, appears to have reference to the phatic act rather than the rhetic act. On the other hand, 'In saying that he was making a mistake', we could replace without changing the sense of the sentence, 'In saying that he made a mistake' or 'By saying that he made a mistake', but we do not say 'In saying that I protested' nor 'By saying that I was protesting'.

Secondly when we claim that the 'In saying' formula does not go with perlocutionary verbs like 'convinced', 'persuaded' etc, exceptions arise through the incorrect use of language. For example, people say ' Are you intimidating me? "instead of 'threatening' and we may say 'In saying he was intimidating me'. Also the same word may be used in both illocutionary and perlocutionary ways, e.g.; the verb, 'tempting' may be used in either way. We do not have 'I tempt you to', but we do have 'let me tempt you to', or we may say 'Do have another whack of Ice-cream' - 'Are you tempting me'? This last question will be vague in a perlocutionary sense, since it would be only one for the speaker to answer, if anyone. If the answer is 'Oh, why not'? it seems that

I am tempting him, but in reality he may not be tempted. Again Austin says 'trying to' seems an addition with a perlocutionary verb. But illocutionary cannot be equivalent to 'try to' do something which might be expressed by a perlocutionary verb, e.g. 'argue' is equivalent to 'try to connvince' or 'try to alarm or 'alert'. The distinction between doing and trying to do is already there in illocutionary as well as in the perlocutionary verb. Many illocutionary acts are not cases of trying to do any perlocutionary act, e.g. to promise is not to try to do anything. Still we may ask whether 'In saying' can be applied or used with the perlocutionary acts. Therefore, we find that Austins's contrast of 'In saying' with that of 'By saying' its confusing and ambigous, in its first sense of 'in saying' as applicable to the perlocutions.

On the other hand the 'By saying' formula is also not confined to the perlocutionary verbs. According to Austin there is the locutionary use of 'By saying I meant y...', the illocutionary use of 'By saying X I was thereby warning' and a variety of miscellaneous use, for example, By saying X I put myself in the wrong. But at least there are two uses of 'By saying'.

"(a) By hitting the nail on the head I was driving it into the wall,

(b) By inserting a plate, I was practising dentistry".(77)

The (a) 'By saying', indicates the means by which we bring off the action and in (b) 'By saying', indicates a criterion about what I did which shows my action to be practising dentistry. There is the only difference between the two that the use to indicate criterion seems more external. And this (b) sense (criterion sense) seems very close to the 'In saying' formula. For example, 'In saying X I was warning him'.

We can certainly use 'By saying X I was warning him'. But 'By' in this sense is not used with perlocutionary verbs. For example, if I say 'By saying I convinced him' 'by' will have the means to end sense or may signify the method by which I did it. Austin thinks that 'By' formula is used in 'means-to-end sense' with an illocutionary verb in two kinds of cases:

(a) We use verbal means of doing something instead of non-verbal, e.g., 'By saying "I do", one gets married, here the performative utterance 'I do' is a means to the end of marriage. Here again we use the phatic and not the rhetic acts.

(b) A performative utterance is used as an indirect means to perform another act. For example, 'By saying, "I bid three clubs" We are informed that one had no diamonds. The performative use of 'I bid three clubs' is an indirect means of informing - which is an illocutionary act.

Therefore we find that Austin's 'By' formula is applicable to the performatives and illocutions also. There we find that the two formulas of "In" and "By" for distinguishing the illocutionary and the perlocutionary acts is misleading and the distinction collapses, like other distinctions attempted by Austin.

Thus it becomes expedient to discuss the illocutionary-perlocutionary in terms of consequences and effects, which is the characteristic feature of perlocutions.

These perlocutions are usually, but not always, effects or consequences of the performances of illocutionary acts. But the question is whether these perlocutions are only part of speech act, (particularly performative), or only the consequences of locutions and illocutions. Austin seems to rule out the perlocutionary sense of 'doing an action' and therefore it is not an issuance of an utterance in the sense of a performatory action. A perlocutionary act can be brought-off, in "sufficiently special circumstances" by any

utterance. Constative or performative, e.g. to inform some one before hand about the consequences of doing something, or convincing someone about some fact by stating or uttering certain perlocutionary words or sentences. The giving of an information always produces consequential effects upon that action; and conversely doing any action has always consequences of making ourselves and others aware of certain facts, e.g. the effect of hurling a tomato at a political meeting will be to make others aware that one objects to or contends against certain political beliefs others hold - but this will not make the utterance (e.g. shout) or the throw (a physical act) true or false, and in the same way, the production of any number of consequential effects will not prevent a constative utterance from being true or false. Thus to produce consequences by saying something, Austin calls perlocutionary acts.

According to Austin, effects and consequences can come in even with illocutionary acts, because a successful performance of an illocutionary act does bring in consequences and effects in certain senses, namely '<u>securing uptake</u>', '<u>taking effect</u>' and '<u>inviting responses</u>'.

1. Securing uptake

We achieve a certain amount of effect on the audience, for the illocutionary act is to be carried out as a successful act. Effect here amounts to bringing about understanding of the meaning and the force of the locution or the utterance, e.g. it cannot be said 'to have warned' unless the hearer or the audience hears and understands what we say and what we mean with a certain force, by the illocutionary act of warning. So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the 'securing of uptake'.

2. Taking effect

The illocutionary act 'takes effect' in a particular way, unlike consequences, in the natural course of events, e.g. the utterance 'I name this ship Queen Elizabeth' has the effect of naming the ship, and certain subsequent acts such as referring to it as 'Generalissimo Stalin' will be out of order and therefore unsuccessful.

2. Inviting responses

According to Austin, many illocutionary acts by virtue of convention invite a response or a sequell, which may be 'one way or two way'. For example, arguing, ordering or promising etc, have one way relationship between a speaker and hearer whereas offering has a two way relationship

between the speaker or hearer. However, the second part of this two-way interaction is a separate speech act and not part of the original speech act.

Austin believes that the perlocutions are not conventional acts at all, whereas illocutionary acts are conventional. But the question is whether perlocutionary acts always, achieve their response by non-conventional means, and can responses in illocutionary acts be achieved by nonverbal means? For both questions the answer is 'yes'. For example, an illocutionary act of warning may be performed non-verbally by swinging a stick, but the difficulty arises that the other person or the audience may take the guesture as an act of threatening. Therefore, it is a fact that most of the illocutionary acts cannot be performed without saying something, e.g. stating, informing, arguing, estimating etc which fall in the class of verdictives and expositives. On the other hand perlocutionary effect can be achieved by non-conventional means, e.g. Austin says; "Thus I may persuade some one by gently swinging a big stick or gently mentioning that his aged parents are still in the third Reich".(78)

Thus illocutionary acts can be conventional acts whereas perlocutionary are not conventional. Both kinds of acts can be performed non-verbally but illocutionary acts like warning must be conventional even if non-verbal acts.

But perlocutionary acts are not essentially linguistic, because perlocutionary effects can be achieved without performing any speech-act at all, whereas the illocutionary acts are linguistic acts .

Searle following Austin says:

> When an illocutionary act is successfully and non-defectively performed there will always be an effect produced in the hearer, the effect of understanding the utterance. But in addition to the illocutionary effect of understanding, utterances normally produce, and are often intended to produce, further effects on the feelings, attitudes, and subsequent behaviour of the hearers. These effects are called perlocutionary effects, and the acts of producing them are called perlocutionary acts. For example, by making a statement (illocutionary) a speaker may convince or persuade (perlocutionary) his audience, by making a promise (illocutionary) he may reassure or create expectations (perlocutionary) in his audience.(79)

The peculiarity about Searle's view of perlocutions is that he stresses the intentional and unintentional aspects of perlocutionary acts - which Austin discussed only perfunctorily. From perlocutions, Searle expounds and develops his famous theory of 'intentionality'. For him, perlocutionary effects may be achieved <u>intentionally</u>, as we get the hearer to do a particular thing by asking him or her to do it, or perlocutionary effects may be un-intentional, as e.g., when we do not intend to annoy or exasperate the

audience, but by some misunderstanding the audience gets angry or annoyed. Because there is no convention involved in the perlocutionary effect that such and such utterance counts as convincing or persuading or annoying etc. Searle says,"And that is why none of these perlocutionary verbs has a performative use". [80] For example, there cannot be a performative expression like "I hereby persuade You" because there is no way that the conventional performance can guarantee that you are persuaded as compared to the performance can guarantee that you are persuaded as compared to the performative expressions like "I hereby state" or "I hereby inform you" which involve conventions. Thus Searle thinks that illocutionary acts are by themselves proper and complete speech acts, and therefore, "perlocutionary acts, unlike illocutionary acts, are not essentially linguistic, for it is possible to achieve perlocutionary effects without performing any speech act at all".(81)

REFERENCES

1. Austin J.L.: "A plea for Excuses", Philosophical papers, Edited by Urmson and Warnock Oxford University press, 1970, pp. 181-82.

2. New G.G.: Philosphy and Linguistics "A plea for linguistics" Edited by Colin Lyas, Macmillan Press 1971, p.103.

3. Ibid: pp. 103-4.

4. Searle J.R.: Speech Acts. "An Essay in the Philosophy of Language", Camberidge University press, p.16.

5. Austin, J.L.: How to Do Things with Words. (Cited as HTD onwards). "The William James Lectures delivered at Havard University in 1955", Edited by J.O. Urmson, Oxford at the Clareandon press, 1962, p.3.

6. Ibid, p.5.

7. Lanigana R.L.: Speech act Phenomenology. Martinus Nijhoff Press. The Hague - 1977, p.29.

8. Ibid.: p.31.

9. HTD. : p·5.

10. Ibid.: pp. 14-15.

11. Ibid.: pp. 15-16.

12. Ibid.: p.18.

13. Warnock G.J.: Essays on J.L. Austin, Edited by Berlin, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973, p.72.

14. HTD. : p·26

15. Ibid., p.28.

16. Ibid.: pp. 31-32.

17. Ibid.: p.34.

18. Ibid.: p.35.

19. Ibid.: p. 35-36.

20. Ibid.: pp.36

21. Searle J.R.: Philosophy of Language, Oxford University press, 1971, p.7.

22. Searle & Vandervaken: Foundations of Illocutionary logic. Cambridge University Press, p.13.

23. HTD . p.92.

24. Ibid: p.94.

25. Searle J.R.: "What is a Speech Act"? Philosophy in America. Ed. Max Black, Cornell University Press 1967, p.221.

26. HTD. p.95.

27. Searle J.R.: Speech Acts, An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp. 16-17.

28. HTD 1962, p.95.

29. Ibid: pp. 92, 93.

30. Kenny A: The legacy of Wittigenstein, p.89.

31. Ibid, pp. 91-92

32. Cerf. W: "Critical Review of HTD" in Symposium on J.L. Austin, Ed. K.T. Fann. Routledge and Kegan Paul Press, pp. 356-57.

33. Ibid. p. 357.

34. HTD. p.146

35. Ibid, P. 108.

36. Searle J.R.: "What is a speech act". Philosophy in America, Ed. Max Black. Cornell University Press 1967, p.221.

37. HTD , pp. 98-99.

38. Ibid. pp. 99.

39. Ibid, p. 100.

40. Furberg M: "Meaning and Illocutionary Force" in Symposium on J.L. Austin, Ed. K.T. Fann. Routledge and Kegan Paul London 1969, p.446.

41. HTD p.133.

42. Searle J.R.: Essays on J.L. Austin, Ed. Isiah Berlin and others. Oxford Univeristy Press, 1973, p.1.41.

43. Ibid: p. 143.

44. Searle J.R.: Essays on J.L. Austin, Isaiah Berling and Others; Oxford, Clarendon press 1973, p.147.

45. HTD, PP. 148-49.

46. Ibid: p.150

47. Ibid: p.152

48. Ibid: p.150.

49. Ibid: pp. 154-55

50. Ibid: p.156

51. Ibid: p.159 (Emphasis on attitudes, greetings, wishes is mine)

52. Ibid: p.161

53. Hold Croft D. "Meaning and Illocutionary Acts". The Ratio Volume 6, 1964, p.140.

54. Ibid, p.141.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid: p.142

57. Searle, J.R.: Expression and Meaning: Studies in the theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge University Press, pp. 10-11.

58. Ibid: p.11.

59. Ibid: p.12

60. Searle & Vandervaken: Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, Cambridge University, Press, P.13.

61. Ibid: pp. 13-14.

62. Ibid: p.17.

63. Ibid:

64. Ibid: p.18.

65. Ibid: p.20.

66. Searle, J.R.: Expression and Meaning, Cambridge University Press, p.12.

67. Ibid: p.13.

68. Ibid: p.14

69. Ibid: p.15

70. Ibid

71. Ibid: pp. 16-17.

72. HTD, p.101.

73. Ibid: p.102.

74. Ibid: p.101.

75. Ibid: p.108.

76. HTD, p.121.

77. Ibid: p.128.

78. Ibid: p.118.

79. Searle and Vandervaken: Foundation of Illocutionary Logic, Cambridge University Press, p.11.

80. Ibid: p.12.

81. Ibid.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books & Articles:

Austin J.L.: Philosophical papers edited by J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock. Oxford University Press, 1961.

- How To Do Things with Words. The William James Lectures delivered in Havard University in 1955, edited by J.O. urmson, Oxford University Pres, 1962.

Aliston W.P. Philosophy of Language Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.Princeton Hall 1969.

Altieri, C. Act and Quality. A Theory of Literary Meaning and Humanistic Understanding. The Harvester Press.

Ayer A.J. The Central Questions of Philosophy. Weidenfield and Nicolson, London

- Studies in Communication. London, Martin Secker and Warburg, 1955.

Alexander H.G. Meaning in language, Glenview: Scott, Foresman & Co. 1969.

Berlin, S.I. (eds) Essays on J.L. Austin, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press 1973.

Bates, S. "More on what we say", Metaphilosophy Vol.3. January 1972.

Burch, R.W. "Cohen Austin & Meaning". Ratio Vol.15, June 1973.

Black Max (ed.) Philosophy in America, Allen & Unwin, London, 1965.

— Language & philosophy, Cornell University press 1949.

— _____ Philosophical Analysis. Cornell University press 1963.

Caton, C.E.: Philosophy and ordinary language. University of Illinois press, 1963.

Cohen, L.J. "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist"? Philosophical Quarterly, 1964.

— Searle's theory of Speech Acts". Philosophical Review V.79, October 1970.

Chappel V.C. (ed .) Ordinary Language. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. prentice Hall, 1964.

Cavell.S. Must we Mean what we Say? Cambridge University press, 1976.

Clarke M. "Descriptions and Speech Acts". Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 68 July 1, 1971.

Cooper, D.E. "Meaning & Illocutions" American Philosphical Quartery Jan,1992.

Cameron J.R. "Sentence - Meaning and Speech Acts" Philosophical Quarterly 20. No. 79 April 1970.

— "The Significance of speech Acts and The Meaning of Words". Philosophical Quarterly, 20 No.79, April 1970.

Dance F.E.X. Human Communication Theory:Original Essays. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1967.

Duncan J.A. "Performance and premise" 1967 Philosophicl Quarterly V.14, No.55, April 1964.

Fann K.T. Symposium on J.L. Austin Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979.

Feigl H. and Sellars W. (eds.) Readings in philosophical Analysis, New York: Appleton Century - Crofts, 1949.

Flew A.(ed) Essays in Conceptual Analysis. New York. St.

Martin'spress 1966.

Fordor, J.A. Katz J.J. (eds.) The structure of language. Englewood cliffs, New Jersey prentice Hall, Inc. 1964.

Furberg, Mats. Saying and Meaning: A Main Theme in J.L. Austin's Philosophy. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1971.

Fotion, N. "Master Speech acts". Philosophical Quarterly 21, no.84 July 1971.

Green, D.H. "Intentions and Speech Acts" Analysis 29, no.3. January 1969.

Grice H.P.: "Meaning" Philosophical Review 66, no.3, July 1957.

Hare R.M. "Meaning and Speech Acts" Philosophical Review 79, January 1970.

Heal, J. "Explicit performative utterances and statements". Philosophical Quarterly 24, no.95, April 1974.

Holdcroft,D. "Meaning and Illocutionary Acts" Ratio 6, 1964.

Katz J.J. Propositional Structure And Illocutionary Force. The Harvester press city. Univ. of New York.

— Philosophy of Language. New York,Harper and Row 1966.

— The philosophy of Linguistics, Oxford Univiersity press, 1985.

Kenny A: The Legacy of Wittigenstein.

Lanigan, L.R.: Speech Act Phenomenology. Martinus Nijhoff - The Hague 1977.

Lyas, C (ed) Philosophy And Linguistics, London, Macmillan, St. Martin's Press, 1971.

Mulligan K. Speech Act and Sachverhalt Reinach and the foundations of Realist phenomenology. Martinus Nijhoff publishers.

Mundle C.W.K. Critique of Linguistic Philosophy. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970.

Macdonald.M. Philosophy & Analysis. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1954.

Mackinnon, E. "Language, Speech and Speech Acts". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34, no.2, December 1973.

Olshewsky T.M.: Problems In the Philosophy of Language. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. New York 1969.

O'Neill, B.C.: "Conventions and Illocutionary Force" Philosophical Quarterly 22, no.88 July 1972.

Passmore, J.A.: A Hundred Years of Philosophy. Baltimore, Maryland. Penguin Books, Inc. 1968.

Pahel, K.R.: "Some notes on Austin's how to do things with words". Mind 78, July 1969.

Reinhardt L.R.: "Propositions and Speech Acts". Mind 76, no. 302 April, 1967.

Ryle, G : "Ordinary Language" Philosophical Review, 62-1953.

Rosenberg, J.F., & Travis (eds). Readings in the Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,1971.

Searle J.L. : Expression and Meaning, Studies in the theory of Speech acts, Cambridge University press.

— The philosophy of Language, Oxford University press, 1971.

— Intentionality:An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University press.

— Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge univeristy press, 1969.

Searle & Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary logic. Cambridge University press.

Strawson P.F. "Intention and convention in speech acts". Philosophical Review , 73, 1964.

Sadock, J.M. Toward a Linguistic theory of Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press 1974.

Urmson, J.O.: Philosophical Analysis. Oxford, Clarendon press 1956.

Warnock G.J.: J.L. Austin. The Arguments of the Philosophers, Edited, by Ted Honderich, Routledge press london, 1989.

Williams British Analytical Philosophy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966.

Weitz M. "Oxford Philosophy"

— Philosophical Review, 62, 1953.

— "Review of How to do things with words" Analysis ,23.

****

****

****